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A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE

OF MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

FALL, [illegible]

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

CLEMENCEAU AND THE PANAMA SCANDAL

by

© ROBERT EDGAR KLINCK

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled *Clemenceau and the Panama Scandal*, submitted by Robert Edgar Klinck in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

ABSTRACT

What can be regarded as the first major phase in the long career of Georges Clemenceau in the national politics of France--that during which he sat as a member of the Chamber of Deputies of the Third Republic--lasted from 1876 to 1893. In the months preceding the national elections in the last of these years, he was among a number of politicians compromised by the revelations arising from investigations into the Panama scandal.

It is the intention of this work to examine the nature of Clemenceau's involvement in the Panama affair and its consequences. As major sources, this study utilizes the published findings of two official parliamentary inquiries into the scandal, as well as two contemporary newspapers--*La Justice*, of which Clemenceau was the director and in which he explained or refuted various charges made against him, and *Le Figaro*, a conservative daily that first published much information relevant to his case.

The manner in which Clemenceau was alleged to be implicated in the scandal was atypical: most of the politicians suspected of malfeasance were believed to have received bribes from the Panama Company, but this question was not raised in connection with Clemenceau. What involved him were his long-standing relations with financiers discovered to have been guilty of crimes of bribery and blackmail. Evidence from divers sources suggested that he had been aware of these persons' criminal acts, that he had benefited from them, and that occasionally he had personally accommodated his political activities

to their purposes. Clemenceau vigorously refuted this interpretation of the evidence.

His case was never subjected to a juridical judgment. This circumstance appears to have been in large part the incidental result of measures taken by persons in government--embarrassed by the Panama revelations and fearful of their political consequences--to stifle the entire affair.

Nevertheless, following an electoral campaign of extraordinary violence, in which the main issue (complicated by the propagation of the false accusation that Clemenceau had been a traitor for England) was Clemenceau's suitability to remain a deputy, his electors ousted him from the Chamber.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The political career of Georges Clemenceau is one of the most remarkable for its longevity and influence in the past century of French history. A doctor by profession, Clemenceau obtained his first political office a day after the overthrow of the Second Empire of Napoleon III on September 4, 1870, when he was appointed Mayor of a district in Paris. Thereafter, political activity was the main preoccupation of his life, and his fortunes in the field appear, superficially, to have been steadily ascendant. After the bloody suppression of the Commune, he was one of eighty members elected to the Municipal Council of the capital city. Although selected as President of the Council in November 1875, he ran the following February for a seat in the newly constituted Chamber of Deputies. Elected--and re-elected four times--he acquired a prestigious reputation as a deputy, becoming a leading spokesman for the minority Left Republican parliamentary faction designated as "Radical." Adherents of this group were (in contradistinction to the larger body of Republicans known as "Opportunists" for their amenability to compromise) intransigent advocates of the application of republican principles to French political and social life. They demanded reforms whose intention was anti-clerical (universal lay education), democratic (abolition of the Senate), and socially beneficial (introduction of a tax on income and nationalization of railroads, mines, and banks). In 1902 Clemenceau entered the Senate. In 1906 he obtained his first cabinet portfolio, as well as his first premiership. Premier

a second time in 1917, he died twelve years later a national hero for having led France through the dark days near the end of World War I to the victory duly registered at Versailles.

However, in the midst of this eminent career, there is a curious hiatus. In 1893 Clemenceau was defeated in the national elections by a relatively obscure figure in circumstances from which it was widely believed that he could never, politically, recover.

Opinions as to the causes and significance of his political expunction in 1893 have varied--most extremely among his popular biographers. One such, Ernest Judet, an inimical contemporary of Clemenceau, alleged that the Panama upheaval had uncovered his corrupt connections and political practices.[1] On the other hand, the numerically predominant sympathetic lives of Clemenceau generally treat such accusations as contrived and abominable libels. One of the most recent and extensive works in the genre which adopts this approach, by Gaston Monnerville, is avowedly predicated upon the assumption that, "Il est aujourd'hui acquis que l'intégrité morale de Clemenceau, son honnêteté, sont hors de toute atteinte."[2]

As a rule, the views of scholars on the matter have been more moderate. A generation after the events, Charles Seignobos asserted, without elaboration, that Clemenceau's electoral defeat had resulted from the exposure during the Panama scandal of his connections with criminal financiers.[3] More recently, another French scholar, Jacques Chastenet, stated that, although Clemenceau was compromised in the scandal, his fiercest detractors produced no proofs of their allegations.[4] Among English historians, D.W. Brogan declares that Clemenceau had been monetarily dependent upon a financier who was proven a blackmailer and

who had gained much, at least in terms of reputation, from his association with the Radical leader.[5] Guy Chapman's treatment of the scandal contains some details of this association, excusing Clemenceau's imprudence on the ground of his having been "a bad judge of men;" he considers it 'fortunate' that Clemenceau appears to have bought out the financier's investments in his newspaper before the latter committed his crimes.[6]

With Brogan, Clemenceau's most reliable biographers, Georges Michon[7] and Geoffrey Bruun,[8] attribute Clemenceau's electoral defeat to propagation of the charge that he was a traitor for England, although both trace the origin of this story back to the Panama scandal, in which, they allow, Clemenceau was compromised. A recent work on the scandal itself by the French economic historian Jean Bouvier indicates that although the Panama revelations removed him from political office for ten years, he was probably not guilty "au sens juridique du mot."[9]

However, no full historical exposition of the nature of the way in which Clemenceau was implicated in the Panama scandal has ever been undertaken. The following work sets the rectification of this situation as one of its major tasks. Also, it will plumb the motives of his accusers in an attempt to ascertain to what extent the charges against him were justified or merely the recrudescence of enmities that he had acquired in his past; it will explore and evaluate the attitude of the French government toward his case; and it will describe the electoral campaign which culminated in his defeat.

If this shadowy incident in Clemenceau's career cannot be entirely elucidated, perhaps, at least, some of the confusion with which it is surrounded can be dispelled.

CHAPTER TWO

THE PANAMA SCANDAL[1]

The first serious attempt to dig a canal through the isthmus connecting the two American continents--that undertaken by French interests during the decade of the 1880's--entailed vastly more disappointment and human debasement than glory. The enterprise was a failure, in the wake of which followed one of the most resounding politico-financial scandals of modern times.

Dating from the time of Hernando Cortez, the idea of cutting a navigable trench through the isthmus had become increasingly current with the rise of commerce accompanying the industrialization of the nineteenth century and the settlement of the American West. The task, however, was awesome, and there was no one possessed of sufficient audacity or foolhardiness to essay it before it attracted the interest of Ferdinand de Lesseps in the mid-1870's. In France, de Lesseps was a national hero of tremendous charisma, "le grand Français," for having inspired to completion the Suez Canal between 1855 and 1869. His previous successes, accomplished in the face of much ridicule and hostile criticism, had instilled in him a blind self-confidence, which, if it provided the Panama project with the endorsement of the man whose reputation could best launch it with auspicious prospects, sowed some of the seeds of its eventual failure.

At Paris in May 1879 de Lesseps chaired an international congress for the study of interoceanic canals, at which the general concept of the Panama venture was worked out. Against a feeble opposition,

his notion that the ditch should be an "oceanic Bosporus"--at sea-level and including no locks--received the delegates' sanction. The total cost of the project was estimated at 1,174,000,000 francs and the time until its completion at eight years providing that adequate equipment was obtainable.

However, developments did not follow as smooth a course outside of the realm of speculation and planning. The first attempt made by the *Compagnie Universelle du Canal Interocéanique du Panama* to capitalize their undertaking proved disastrous. Barely 30,000,000 francs worth of the first issue of shares, whose nominal value was 400,000,000, was purchased. For the Company administrators this was a traumatic experience that had important repercussions. In an effort to ensure that succeeding issues of stock would not be so poorly subscribed, they organized a vast publicity campaign--including promotion tours and falsified progress reports intended to engender an unwarranted optimism about the project--that henceforth was to be a permanent adjunct of the Company's operations. Critical press comment, widespread before the first emission of shares, became markedly less common after the Company administrators discovered the most fruitful medium through which to communicate to the journalistic community. The ultimate cost of paying one newspaper to print a laudatory article, another to suppress some unfavourable judgment, was 14,000,000 francs.[2] Doubts about the morality of such procedures diminished in proportion to their success in extending the lease on life of the project. And, indeed, before it collapsed these delusive expedients had induced 850,000 Frenchmen to invest nearly 1,400,000,000 francs in the enterprise.

The picture presented in the French press was, then, an

inaccurate reflection of actual conditions at the site of the ditching, where all was far from well. Apart from the fact that his sea-level concept was impracticable, de Lesseps had failed to anticipate two major problems that had not been encountered in the deserts of Egypt. One was sanitary: medical science, having not yet discovered that malaria and yellow fever were transmitted by mosquitoes, could not prevent hundreds of persons (especially the white technicians) from being killed by disease; the second, geological: the nature of the soil, particularly in the range of hills called Culebra, was such that it was continuously slipping in to refill previous excavations. Although the French did make significant progress in the construction of the Canal, the original estimates of the time and cost involved proved extremely unrealistic. Before the Americans completed the project, with locks, in 1914, over six times as much volume of earth had been displaced as had been indicated in the first French calculations.[3]

However, the digging continued in spite of these unforeseen difficulties. And, as French investment in the project mounted, the moral question was complicated by the factor of the harm that France's international prestige would suffer should her efforts fail--an especially sensitive issue to the country, which was still nursing the bruises administered to her national pride by the Prussian War of 1870-1871.

Meanwhile, a deterioration of its temporarily improved financial situation forced the Company in June 1886 to apply to the Freycinet cabinet for permission to raise funds through the expedient of a lottery loan. Since lotteries were illegal, such a measure required the voting of a special dispensation in both the Senate and

the Chamber of Deputies. A cautious initial reaction to the request, in part because of recommendations made in a report prepared for a previous cabinet that the government should not become involved in the Company's financial affairs, was followed by the stalling of the matter outside of parliament for over a year. During this period the Company desperately attempted three issues of stock, each of which was subscribed more poorly than its predecessor. Then, on April 28, 1888, the lottery loan proposal passed the Chamber with a surprisingly large majority--a circumstance in part explained, perhaps, by later revelations that the Panama Company had made funds (designated for "publicity") available for wholesale bribery of both legislative houses.

For the Company, however, all was in vain. The lottery was subscribed to the extent of only a third of requirements, and the corporation was legally dissolved on February 4, 1889.

The subsequent scandal resulted from the exposure of the dubious practices, in which many persons occupying positions of public trust or responsibility had apparently participated, to which the Company had resorted in its struggle to survive. The breaking of the *affaire* was deferred for nearly four years after the liquidation of the Company, in part because of the government's being reluctant to inquire into a matter that could diminish the reputation of the Republican regime whose very existence seemed threatened contemporaneously by the Boulanger crisis (see below, p. 43), and in part because the opponents of the regime had not been supplied with sufficient information from the thieves (who eventually fell out) to present a viable argument that the corruption had actually occurred.

There were three main promoters of the parliamentary corruption: Baron Jacques de Reinach, Cornélius Herz, and Émile Arton. Reinach's progenitors were a prominent Jewish family of Frankfurt. He had inherited his title from his father, who had been ennobled by Victor Emmanuel II. A partner in a reputable Parisian banking house, the younger Reinach promoted major construction projects throughout the world. In 1886 he became the financial agent of the Panama Company. Arton was his subordinate, the pay-off man to those who sold their influence to the corporation.

Unlike Reinach, Herz had risen from obscure origins to a position of influence in French financial, political, and scientific affairs. Three years after his birth at Besançon in 1845, his parents had emigrated to New York, where he became a naturalized American citizen. Returning to Europe to complete his education, he served as a medical aid in the army of the Loire during the Franco-Prussian War. He went back to the United States, obtained a medical certificate from the Chicago Medical School, married a Bostonian, and in 1875 departed for San Francisco. If *The New York Times* is to be given credence, the discovery of his having swindled several people forced him to quit the city,[4] and in 1877 he was back in France. There he established a respectable reputation in scientific circles by promoting the experimentation of Marcel Deprez with the electrical transmission of power and by founding a scientific journal, *La Lumière électrique*, in 1879, the same year that he began the rise through the ranks of the *Légion d'honneur* that culminated in his being appointed Grand Officer on the recommendation of Premier Freycinet in 1886. Like Baron de Reinach, Herz had personal connections transcending party lines with

men of political influence.

Herz was a business associate of Reinach from 1880 until the latter's death twelve years later, but there was a dimension to their relations that was not known until the Panama investigations of 1892-1893, when the confiscation of the Baron's private papers revealed that Herz had been blackmailing him since at least 1886.[5] What secret the two men shared was never definitely established. Herz told Henri Rochefort, the former communard and Boulangist, that Reinach had murdered a young bank employee;[6] but on one occasion when Herz was wielding his threats of exposure Reinach wrote to the American's go-between that, "C'est n'est pas celui qui offre l'argent qui est coupable, mais bien le fonctionnaire ou le membre du gouvernement qui accepte de l'argent,"[7] suggesting that Herz controlled him through his knowledge of the Baron's corrupt business practices. In any case, in August 1894 Herz was sentenced *in absentia* (for he had fled to England, whose government refused to extradite him and where he died in July 1898) to five years imprisonment for blackmail. This verdict was upheld when Herz appealed.[8]

The first public stir over the issue was caused by a series of articles run in September 1892 by a recently established anti-Semitic newspaper, *La Libre Parole*. Their author was a former provincial banker named Ferdinand Martin, who had been employed by the Panama Company. Having fallen out with his superiors, he frankly admitted that he wrote his exposé to vent a grudge.[9] Nevertheless, some of his charges were expressed with a specificity that it was impossible to ignore. For example, he cited instances of press bribery and accused former Minister of Public Works Charles Baïhaut and former Minister

of Agriculture François Barbe (since deceased) of having received substantial bribes from the Company. More generally, Martin cast suspicion on the purposes of the numerous consultations that he had observed Company administrators having with politicians from Radical, Opportunist, and Rightist camps; and he suggested that bribes distributed at the last minute by Arton were responsible for effecting the change in the results of the lottery votes on April 27, 1888, when there were so many abstentions that not even a quorum was obtained, and on April 28, when 269 deputies cast for approval and only 132 against, a number revoking the opposition that they had expressed on the preceding day.[10]

Thereafter, the scandal rapidly gained momentum. On November 4, 1892, Baron de Reinach was interrogated by Appeal Court Judge Prinet in the course of an investigation into alleged malfeasance by the Panama Company administrators that had been begun over a year previously. Unable to provide a satisfactory explanation of the use to which 3,000,000 francs ostensibly for "publicity" had been put, Reinach emerged from the questioning seriously compromised. Two weeks later his body was found in his apartment. Although the precise cause of his death was never established, even by an autopsy, the circumstances strongly suggest that he had committed suicide in preference to being tried for criminal activities.[11]

On the following day the Catholic deputy Jules Delahaye voiced a number of insinuations to an agitated Chamber about corruption among its members. He based his contentions, he said, upon information given him by an anonymous source knowledgeable of the activities of the Panama Company, who had shown him a list of 172 men--including about

150 deputies and senators--who had been bought at the time of the lottery loan request. There was considerable insistence from the moderate Left benches that he specify by name those whom he was accusing, which Delahaye countered with the argument that, if the names were really desired, they would be discovered by an official investigation. He named a bank where cancelled cheques used in the bribery could be found and the principal distributor of them, Arton. His motion to set up a Commission of Inquiry was voted only after a fierce debate in which he argued that anyone opposing the idea must have something to hide.[12] Even then, 218 deputies braved the stigma with which he threatened them and cast their ballots against the measure.

Once the Commission had been established, all political factions expressed the hope that its investigations would shed full light on the charges that Delahaye had made from the tribune. In reality, however, there was less unanimity of sentiment on the matter than appearances indicated. The Opportunists, during whose government the crimes were alleged to have been committed, and the Radicals, fearing that the imminent crisis of the regime could produce conditions propitious for another attempt at an anti-parliamentary coup similar to that which had threatened the Republic in 1889, were concerned that the affair should end as speedily and uneventfully as possible. Spokesmen for both of these groups regularly expressed suspicion that the parliamentary scandal was an artificial diversion perpetrated by the Company officials in order to distract attention from their own misdeeds. The political Right, seizing the opportunity to discredit the regime, generally retained the initiative in keeping the affair alive. This circumstance was lamented by the few socialists in the Chamber, although they

welcomed the scandal itself. From Germany Engels wrote to Paul Lafargue that he regarded the recent developments as delightful, and that they made him feel forty years younger: "To my mind c'est le commencement de la fin. The bourgeois republic and its politicians can hardly outlive this unparalleled exposure."[13] In a reply analyzing their "false position" Lafargue explained why the socialists were unable to capitalize on the situation:

> It was the Monarchist-Boulangists who started the denunciations and who kept them up and, so far, all the deputies and senators found with Panama cheques are Republicans and we could not appear to be making common cause with the Right.[14]

He blasted Engels' hopes that a revolutionary situation was preparing as "imbecile." Five years earlier, when it was revealed that the son-in-law, Daniel Wilson, of the president of the Republic was trafficking in appointments to the *Légion d'honneur,* there had been a popular protest demonstration in Paris 100,000 strong. No such incident occurred during the Panama scandal, compared with which the previous affair seemed insignificant. The passivity of the populace caused individuals who were not socialists to express concern that France's failure to rise against an administration riddled with corruption indicated a desiccation of her revolutionary spirit.[15]

The Commission of Inquiry, consisting of seventeen moderate Republicans, six Radicals, nine Rightist deputies, and a Boulangist, sat for nearly half a year. It discovered substantial evidence to support Delahaye's charges. Notations on the stubs of twenty-six cheques written by Baron de Reinach in July 1888 identified five senators and five deputies among the recipients.[16] Charles Rouvier, Jules Roche, Antonin Proust, and Paul Devès--all *chéquards,* as those said to have accepted

bribes were called--had held cabinet posts. The information on the stubs was confirmed by an abbreviated list of allegedly corrupted politicians that had been drawn up by Baron de Reinach in 1890 and that former Radical deputy Louis Andrieux deposited with the Commission in December 1892. Written at the bottom of this list was a statement to the effect that Arton had distributed 1,340,000 francs among another 104 parliamentarians (only one, Sans-Leroy, being named) for their support in securing approval of the lottery loan.[17] Nevertheless, it was the opinion of deputy Ernest Vallé, drafter of the final Commission report, that the evidence was insufficient to warrant a condemnation of the politicians who were implicated.

Contemporary judicial inquiries into the Panama scandal terminated in two main trials in 1893. On February 9, the Company directors were sentenced to terms of imprisonment of from two to five years for swindling. When appealed in June, this verdict was quashed on the technicality that the condemned had been charged with their crimes more than three years after their commission.[18] Ten parliamentarians had their immunity from arrest removed as a result of the discovery of Reinach's cheque stubs, but most of the cases against them were thrown out for lack of evidence by the preliminary examining judge, Franqueville, before even being brought into court. The others were acquitted during the trial for political corruption in March. Franqueville and the court accepted the politicians' explanations that they knew nothing of the cheques or that they had received them for legitimate reasons. Ultimately, only Baïhaut, Minister of Public Works when the lottery loan was voted, who was not among those listed in Reinach's papers but who confessed his guilt, was imprisoned. He served nearly all of a five-year sentence.[19]

Almost certainly, much corruption went unpunished. Its actual

extent, however, has been a subject of historical dispute. In total, the names of approximately thirty political personnages were discovered beside figures in the papers of Reinach and Arton. The latter, arrested in 1895 (following which event a second parliamentary commission was appointed which produced a second *Rapport général* in 1898, and there were more trials and acquittals), testified that he had distributed over a million francs among twenty-six politicians in July 1888, but for a variety of reasons, some perfectly legitimate.[20] It was the opinion of Ferdinand Martin, whose allegations had helped to initiate the scandal, that a list of 145 parliamentarians--that he said ten different persons possessed and had shown him--was inaccurate. He believed that Arton had assembled the list to satisfy Reinach, but that, in fact, the former had kept for himself much of the money that the Baron had given him for the bribery of the politicians.[20]

The widest and most contrary implications were ascribed to the Panama scandal by those who lived through it. The Rightist deputy Maurice Barrès (who believed in the fullest measure of corruption, but said that no one, including the accusers, were really concerned to discover the truth of the matter) has left a number of vivid vignettes of incidents in the Chamber--one accused deputy physically assaulting his detractor, another weeping at the tribune--to demonstrate what he termed the utter "vulgarity" of the whole French parliamentary system.[22] But others argued that merely surviving the upheaval had proven the fundamental soundness of the system. "Aucune monarchie n'y aurait persisté," contended Republican deputy Armand Després.[23]

Whatever the case, the shadow of the suspicions voiced about corruption during the Panama affair were to hang over the careers of many politicians for many years. It is to the consideration of one of these cases that, henceforth, our attention will be directed.

CHAPTER THREE

THE QUESTION OF CLEMENCEAU'S COMPLICITY

At the time of the Panama scandal one of the individuals accused of malfeasance by certain elements of the French press and politicians of stripes varying from conservative to revolutionary socialist was Georges Clemenceau, leader of the Radical faction in the Chamber of Deputies. Belief in his alleged wrong-doing was arrived at by a more circuitous reasoning process than that applied to the cases of most of the other deputies charged with corruption. His name was not known to be on any list, genuine or apocryphal, of *chéquards*; he was never indicted by any judicial apparatus. *La Justice*, the newspaper of which he was the director, was conspicuously absent from the report of the Commission's financial expert Flory on subventioning of the press by the Panama Company. That he was among the 269 deputies who voted for approval of the lottery loan in April 1888 was no proof of his criminality, for even the highest estimates of the number of parliamentarians who had been bribed did not place the figure beyond approximately 150. Nevertheless, Clemenceau's name ultimately came to be among those most closely associated with the phenomenon of *panamisme*--the term newly coined to describe the corruption accompanying the increasing interlocking of the interests of politics, big business, and finance. At the height of the scandal he was summoned before Judge Franqueville, the Commission, and a court trying those accused of political corruption to explain a number of personally compromising circumstances that had been turned up by investigation.

The basic issue about which all of his interrogations turned was his labyrinthine relationships to Baron de Reinach and Cornélius Herz. These connections suggested to some persons, especially political opponents, that Clemenceau had been a participant in the corrupt business dealings of the two financiers and even, perhaps, shared in the lucre that Herz was able to extract from Reinach through blackmail. The Radical leader was acquainted with both men. Reinach he had known since 1885, at least. In testimony before the Commission of Inquiry, near the end of 1892, he described the genesis of his acquaintanceship with the Baron as follows: Reinach had opposed him in favour of Jules Roche in the campaign waged in the Var during the elections of the fall of 1885. Upon his victory over Roche, he was approached by Reinach, whose ambition it was to establish amiable relations with the deputy who represented the district in which much of the work of a railroad-building company over which he presided was being done.[1] This was not an accurate account of the facts. A letter found among Reinach's confiscated papers establishes that he and Clemenceau not only knew each other before the election, but were on friendly terms. Indeed, Clemenceau had attempted to arrange the Baron's running as a Radical candidate, although the project fell through.[2] Since 1885, said Clemenceau, he and Reinach had had infrequent meetings concerned with such matters as the reorganization of the Bank of France and railroad construction.[3]

The subject of nearly all of the critical comment directed at the Radical leader in connection with the Panama affair, the relations that Clemenceau had with Herz were of a more intriguing and intimate nature. According to a statement made by Clemenceau several years

before his death, Adrien Hébrard, Herz's and Reinach's business partner and editor of *Le Temps*, had introduced him to Herz about the time of the establishment of *La Justice* in January 1880.[4] Clemenceau also admitted that Herz had become one of a number of sleeping partners in this sounding-board of Radical politics, and later a major shareholder in the newspaper. In 1883 Clemenceau gave Herz one-half of his uncommitted shares in recompense for previous advances made to him by the financier. Two years later, said Clemenceau, he bought Herz's interest out.[5]

However, the two men were not connected through business affairs alone. Apparently, a close friendship developed between them. They accompanied each other to the opera and the Durand restaurant and could be observed together occasionally at the offices of *La Justice*.[6] Many years later Clemenceau revealed that he had at one time drafted a document making Herz the legal guardian of his children in the event of his own demise. This he appears to have done in the summer of 1884 before travelling to a cholera-stricken district in southern France in the company of a dozen fellow deputies of extreme Leftist persuasion.[7] It warrants remark, as well, that Clemenceau's younger brother, Paul, was employed in the offices that Herz had established for the commercial exploitation of the inventions of Marcel Deprez.[8] In his hostile biography of Clemenceau, the Radical leader's enduring enemy Ernest Judet alleges that Hébrard told him that once (the date is not specified) when Herz fell ill his refusal to be treated by any doctor other than Clemenceau, who was out of town, very nearly cost him his life.[9]

Yet Herz's interest in Clemenceau seems to have been not

entirely on a personal or professional plane: apart from the sizeable losses that the financier sustained on his investments in *La Justice*, his connections with the Radical faction were highly remunerative. Also, his fortunes apparently benefited from an improvement in those of the Radicals, whose political prominence increased after the legislative elections of 1885. As a result of these elections, the Opportunists, although still the largest group in the Chamber, held a minority of the seats. Seeking Radical support in order to ensure the viability of his cabinet, Premier Charles de Freycinet bestowed several portfolios on Radicals in January 1886. One went to Granet, Minister of *Postes et Télégraphes*; another, to General Boulanger, Minister of War. Both of these men advanced Herz's business fortunes. Granet, for example, went so far in promoting Herz's project to obtain a monopoly over telephonic communications if France as to draft the concession. The maneuvre was torpedoed by a press exposure. One of Clemenceau's more judicious biographers, Geoffrey Bruun, states that the Radical leader could not possibly have been ignorant of the operation.[10]

However, because confirmatory evidence is lacking, speculating on the probability of his having been aware of Herz's scheme is apt to do Clemenceau an injustice. The situation is somewhat different in the case of Boulanger. Clemenceau had known the General from the time when they were teenagers together at the *lycée* of Nantes. Although susequently they parted ways, the two men were apparently on cordial terms with each other before Boulanger's appointment to the War ministry.[11] At the time it was widely accepted that the latter was under the patronage of Clemenceau, who supposedly had forced him upon Freycinet.[12] Most historians concur in this belief.[13] In any case, Clemenceau verbally referred to Boulanger as "mon homme."[14] The

General had equally close relations with Cornélius Herz. In December 1892, while under attack by the old Boulangists Paul Déroulède and Lucien Millevoye in the Chamber for his past associations with Herz, who had been exposed as the recipient of large sums in Reinach's post-lottery-loan account-settling, Clemenceau attempted to silence his antagonists with the retort that, "M. le général Boulanger n'a pas eu d'ami plus chaud, plus dévoué que M. Cornélius Herz." He also revealed that, "Boulanger se servait de l'argent et de l'influence de M. Cornélius Herz," with whom the General had had a voluminous correspondence. Conceding the truth of these assertions, the Boulangists replied that Boulanger had told them that he had first been introduced to Herz through the direct intercession of Clemenceau himself. The Radical leader did not deny it.[15] If this was so, the introduction must have taken place before or during 1884, for Herz was receiving friendly correspondence from Boulanger at that time.[16] After Boulanger became War Minister, both Herz and Clemenceau paid him visits on practically a daily basis.[17] It is possible that Herz's daughter was referring to this period when, many years later, she recollected for historian Bruno Weil that her father and Clemenceau had at one time been in contact virtually every day.[18]

An indication that Boulanger was, like Baron de Reinach, in a state of virtual subservience to Herz is given by an incident recorded by Louis Andrieux in his memoirs in 1926. In the spring of 1886, he claimed, Herz asked him (Andrieux was then a Radical deputy) if there was any favour that he could do for him. Andrieux answered, half-jokingly, that the businessmen of a town in the electoral district that he represented would be appreciative of an augmentation in

the size of its garrison. Taking paper and pen, Herz had Andrieux dictate to him the authorization that he would like the War Minister to write for him. Three days later Andrieux received in his mail the letter, opening "Mon cher ami" (although he had never even met Boulanger), which the General had copied "sans y changer un iota." Andrieux said that he had deposited the letter in the departmental archives for the perusal of skeptics.[19] There is no evidence that he felt any special enmity for Boulanger. Nevertheless, in 1893, before the Commission he had declared that he could not remember precisely when or under what circumstances he had first met Herz.[20] At that time Andrieux's own relations with the financier were suspect and he could have been telling less than he knew.

In light of these relationships between Clemenceau, Herz, and Boulanger, the manner in which the War Minister furthered Herz's business interests is extremely interesting. When the introduction of the Lebel rifle made necessary new production machinery, Boulanger sent an engineer named Léon Chabert to purchase patents in New York.[21] The recipient of two of Reinach's July cheques, Chabert had not only been the Baron's and Herz's business partner since 1881,[22] but was Herz's intermediary--"complice," says the *Rapport général* of 1898--in his blackmail of Reinach and was entrusted with the direct reception of extorted funds.[23] Chabert was never tried for his part in the crime, but that he was initiated to the real nature of the bond between the two financiers is evident from Reinach's correspondence. In October 1886 Boulanger played "le bon rôle" (as Reinach put it in a letter three years later)[24] as signatory of a contract to purchase over half a million beds for the military forces from the *Société des*

fournitures militaires. Behind the front men in this organization was its real creator and moving spirit, Baron de Reinach.[25] Herz, exercising his dominion over the banker, ultimately profited most from the deal. His receipts totalled 2,250,000 francs.[26] Although Boulanger was Clemenceau's creature, politically, it is not known whether or not Clemenceau was himself involved in these maneuvres.

There were undercurrents of suspicion that these three men--Clemenceau, Boulanger, and Herz--had been involved, in various combinations, in dealings of a dubious nature. During Boulanger's ministry *Le Parti ouvrier* alleged that there were intrigues going on in military supply.[27] On September 26, 1886, the painter Frantz Jourdain, claiming to have inside information, diverted the company at the home of the prominent novelist Edmond de Goncourt with a recitation of Herz's secret business dealings with Clemenceau and Daniel Wilson.[28]

Late in October of the same year the Catholic-Monarchist newspaper *Le Monde* ran an article suggesting that Herz's promotion six months earlier to the rank of Grand Officer in the *Légion d'honneur* could be attributed to the influence that he had upon Clemenceau as a result of subsidizing his newspaper. After being visited by two emissaries from the War Ministry, the author of the article retracted; but the issue had excited so much comment that on December 3, 1886, *La Justice* carried the following notice:

> M. Herz n'est pas commanditaire de la *Justice*. Il a été actionnaire du 26 février 1883 au 15 avril 1885. M. Clemenceau lui a cédé, le 26 février 1883, la moitié des actions liberées en paiement des sommes versées par lui du 31 mars 1881 au 16 juin 1883.
> Le 15 avril 1885, M. Clemenceau a racheté les actions de M. Herz.

M. Clemenceau n'a jamais recommandé M. Herz à aucun ministre ni à personne, pour aucune affaire ni pour aucune faveur.[29]

This document was to occupy a pivotal position in subsequent debate about Herz's financial and political connections with Clemenceau.

After Boulanger lost his portfolio in May 1887,[30] Herz made several extended trips across Europe. In his absence, rumour of his links with Clemenceau abated. However, it did not entirely disappear. In a biographical sketch of Herz included by Édouard Drumont (a journalist notorious for having written a history of France depicting it as enslaved by Jewish interests) in his *La Fin d'un monde*, first published in 1888, Clemenceau's denials of having fostered Herz's personal and business successes were dismissed with vitriolic sarcasm.[31]

When the Panama scandal broke, the revelation that Herz was implicated in the alleged parliamentary corruption that had preceded the vote on the lottery loan naturally jogged the memories of Clemenceau's political opponents. On December 12, 1892, a mere seven days after Herz was identified as the recipient of two of the pay-off cheques--each worth 1,000,000 francs!--written in July 1888 by the recently deceased Baron de Reinach, the most reputable conservative newspaper in France, *Le Figaro*, carried as its lead article a short biography of Herz. The author, Gaston Calmette, recalled that among his multifarious activities Herz had been a sleeping partner in *La Justice* and declared that in the national elections of 1885 he had munificently subsidized the Radicals' campaign. This information was the prologue to a sensational revelation. Calmette claimed that

Reinach had spent most of the day before his death with Herz, Clemenceau, and the Minister of Finance, Maurice Rouvier, and that on the afternoon of the day that the Baron's body was found Herz had departed for England on the club-train. Senator Devès was cited as a witness to Reinach's and Rouvier's departure from Clemenceau's home on November 19. In conclusion the author posed a number of provocative questions: "Pourquoi ces conferences suprêmes? Pourquoi ces discussions dont on parle? Quelles sont les causes mystérieuses de ce départ soudain?"[32]

The publication of this article had dramatic repercussions. Rouvier, holding his seventh portfolio as Finance Minister, immediately resigned his position on the ground that he could better defend his actions free from the restrictions imposed upon him by his office. "Tout le monde s'accordait à reconnaître que M. Rouvier avait sagement agi en prenant sa résolution," declared *La Justice*;[33] but *Le Temps* commented that deserting the field before battle had even been joined was seemingly guilty behaviour,[34] and in the Chamber the Rightist deputy Déroulède (who had turned down a seat on the Commission of Inquiry) told him that he owed an explanation to the *Haute Cour*.[35]

The *Figaro* article wrought an unusual effect upon Clemenceau, as well. Departing from his custom of allowing others to translate his policies onto the pages of *La Justice*, he wrote a reply to the questions that had been put.[36] His answer conceded enough of the truth of the original allegation to result in his being summoned before the Commission, along with Rouvier and former Minister of the Interior Constans, to explain his activities further. The accounts of these men, which were

generally consistent with each other (Clemenceau, it should be noted, had provided Rouvier with a copy of his own version before printing it in *La Justice* and before the Finance Minister gave his first explanation of the incidents), can be reconstructed as follows.

Reinach called on Rouvier on November 19, 1892, at about mid-day. The Finance Minister had had frequent dealings with the financier previously. Reinach was deeply disturbed by the campaign that a certain section of the press was waging against him in connection with the Panama revelations. "Il m'a déclaré que c'était pour lui une question de vie ou de mort," explained Rouvier.[37] His "humane" sentiments touched, the Minister agreed (reluctantly, so he said) to intervene on the Baron's behalf with Cornélius Herz, whom Reinach believed capable of silencing the anti-Semitic *La Libre Parole* and the Boulangist *La Cocarde*. (In fact, *La Libre Parole* already had an agreement with Reinach whereby they would not criticize him in return for his giving them information about other corruption.)[38] Rouvier insisted that a witness could accompany them to Herz's residence. It is not clear who suggested Clemenceau, but Rouvier agreed that, "il ne pouvait pas y avoir de meilleur témoin."[39] Why Clemenceau, a member of a rival political camp whose newspaper had of late treated him unkindly? Rouvier seemed somewhat confused on this point: on December 13 he said that he approved Clemenceau because the latter "était un de mes amis;"[40] on the following day he told the Commission, "Si j'avais pris un de mes amis, on aurait pu supposer qu'il y avait là des choses qu'on aurait tenir secrètes."[41]

Seeking, but failing to find, Clemenceau at his home, Rouvier and Reinach went to the Chamber of Deputies. There, after listening to

Rouvier's plea for the banker, whom the Minister described as being "dans un état où l'on prend des résolutions les plus graves,"[42] Clemenceau consented to be the required witness.[43] There is no indication of hesitation on his part.

That evening at 7:00 (said Clemenceau) the trio congregated at Herz's house. Rouvier and Clemenceau concurred in stating that the conversation there lasted less than ten minutes, although the former said that they left at about 7:30. Herz declared that the power to do anything about the criticism of Reinach being bruited by the press had been erroneously attributed to him. He could do nothing.[44]

In the street Reinach requested of Clemenceau that he accompany him to the home of Constans, who was popularly rumoured to have a list of corrupted deputies and to be supplying scandal matter to *La Cocarde*. Rouvier departed. Clemenceau, whether or not still in the capacity of a "witness" is unclear, and Reinach called on Constans, who impatiently dismissed the rumours as sheer invention. His visitors left after five minutes. Reinach parted from Clemenceau with the words, "Je suis perdu."[45] The following morning a servant found the Baron dead in his bed. Why had none of the participants in these conversations volunteered their information earlier? Clemenceau told the Commission that he did not doubt that Reinach could have killed himself, but that newspaper reports that the death had resulted from a cerebral hemorrhage convinced him otherwise.[46] This seems a lame explanation in view of the fact that a cabinet had fallen two weeks previous to his testimony for attempting to avoid ordering an autopsy (whose results were inconclusive) on the baron's body. According to Maurice Barrès, some imaginative individuals who thought that Reinach had been murdered considered the

Radical leader as the perpetrator of the crime.[47]

In light of Reinach's situation at the time, there is good reason to question the accuracy of Rouvier's and Clemenceau's accounts. The Baron had more serious concerns than press attacks--which, if untrue, should not, in any case, have disturbed him--for eleven days after his inculpation on November 4, an order had been issued for his arrest and the police had made an (incredibly half-hearted) attempt to search his house.[48] Reminded of these circumstances in the Chamber, Rouvier swore that he did not know that Reinach was to be arrested. The next day before the Commission Clemenceau suddenly remembered a fact that he had not included in his initial account of his peregrinations with the Baron: he was absolutely certain that Reinach had told him that he hoped that he would not be called on even to testify as a witness in the Panama trials.[49]

There was no one to contradict their stories, although the revelation a month later by Andrieux, who was sympathetic with Clemenceau, that Herz had told him that when Rouvier and the Radical leader had visited him they "étaient aussi affolés l'un que l'autre"[50] cast doubt on their alleged innocence and disinterestedness. Vallé did not even mention the incident in his report in 1893; but the *Rapport général* of 1898 expressed extreme skepticism about the incident, describing the contention that the excursions of November 19 had been motivated by a desire to inhibit a press campaign as too "puerile" to deserve much credence.[51] More probably, they opined, the Baron had been endeavouring to recover compromising evidence.[52] No doubt the reference was to the list of corrupted parliamentarians that Reinach had composed and turned over to Herz in 1890, and that found its way thence through

Andrieux to the first Commission in December 1892. The 1898 report made no effort to distinguish each man's rôle in the day's events. However, there is evidence to indicate that Clemenceau had long known of the existence of the list (see below, p. 47 ff.). Rouvier's name was twice on it,[53] which would suggest that his motives for involving himself in Reinach's cause were less altruistic than he maintained. The call on Constans fits the pattern, as well, for, although he denied the fact on his word of honour (having refused to take an oath to tell the whole truth), he possessed a similar list, which he had been given while Minister of the Interior by an important Panama Company official.[54]

Clemenceau's relations with Herz since the fall of Boulanger were suddenly subjects of acute interest. Some light was shed on them during the Panama investigations. On December 14, 1892, Clemenceau told the Commission that he had seen Herz irregularly during these years. The financier had passed through Paris in his travels, but they did not invariably get together. He said that he had not visited Herz for two years.[55] Three months later he specified the date of one of their meetings as December 1887.[56] For this to have been the case, they must have met outside of the country, for apparently Herz was not in France during this period.[57] Indeed, in January 1894 Herz told Calmette that at about that time Clemenceau had come to see him in Italy "me demander d'oublier certaines choses qui m'avaient forcé à me séparer brusquement de lui;"[58] however, Clemenceau denied this, explaining (without further reference to the encounter in December 1887) that he had been invited by Herz to visit him in Italy, but had gone to Carlsbad instead.[59] In any case, if a visit on foreign territory had then taken place, it was not a unique occurrence--

the demonstration of this fact constituting a disproof of Clemenceau's contention that he had not seen Herz for two years prior to December 1892.

Confused rumours about a more recent meeting had been circulating in the newspapers of Paris for several days before *Le Figaro* gave them substance on December 24 by publishing an interview that one of its reporters had had with Henri Rochefort in England (the latter having been driven into exile in 1889 by a verdict of the *Haute Cour* that he had been plotting sedition in company with General Boulanger). Rochefort asserted that merely ten months before Clemenceau's "two years" statement, he, Rochefort, had been approached by Andrieux and Louis Guillot, a former deputy and Herz's business manager, who invited him on Clemenceau's behalf to a meeting in London that would have as its object the formation of an alliance between the Radical and Revisionist political factions in preparation for the elections eighteen months away. Rochefort accepted. On the following day Guillot came to him once more to advise him that Clemenceau had arrived and that the meeting would take place in the home of a personal friend of the Radical leader. Rochefort inquired who that was and received the answer, "Cornêlius Herz." Since Herz had a poor reputation with Rochefort's associates, he required assurances that the financier would not play an active rôle in the political discussions. Rochefort, Clemenceau, Herz, and Guillot enjoyed a cordial supper together--although little lasting success was achieved in the negotiation of a political alliance, and the first two members of the group shared dinner again on the following day before Clemenceau returned to France. Rochefort reciprocated Herz's hospitality a few

days later.[60]

Clemenceau's comments on Rochefort's account appeared the next day in *La Justice*. He allowed its correctness (except insofar as Rochefort had said that the Radical leader had exposed a plan for bringing down the current ministry); but he attributed the initiative in organizing the encounter to Guillot, who, he claimed, had known for several days that he would be visiting friends near Dorking.[61] Whatever the truth, Clemenceau's credibility was diminished. He had evidently anticipated being queried by the Commission about his controversial relations with Herz, even taking relevant documents into his first interrogation, and yet he had seen the financier over a year later than he had said in his testimony--in circumstances that it was not likely that he would have forgotten. Not only that, but, a mere four days before the appearance of the *Figaro* article, Paul Déroulède, without contradiction from Clemenceau, had told the Chamber of a similar meeting that he had had with the Radical leader before the elections of October 1885. The object had been to win Déroulède to Clemenceau's political camp, the preliminaries--solicitation by a deputy (unnamed)--had been the same, and the meeting had taken place at Herz's house and in the financier's presence.[62]

In the same speech Déroulède had called into question more than Herz's connections with Clemenceau's political activities: he had also challenged the veracity of the Radical leader's explanation of his monetary relations with Herz. This is an issue that some historians have treated with astonishing superficiality, J.H. Jackson[63] and H.M. Hyndman[64] being among the worst examples. Clemenceau had a reputation for extravagance in his style of life at this time.[65] He was, for

example, a passionate participant in the contemporary mania for collecting oriental art works. "Son appartement," wrote a visitor (the sister of his future sister-in-law), "bondé de ces richesses, me semblait un merveilleux conte de fée."[66] Also, he frequented both the wealthy company of the bankers Erlanger and Berthier[67] and the fast company of the Parisian theatre. He was an avid pursuer of women--his grandson has commented on his numerous illegitimate progeny--[68]and some of his mistresses had a high purchase price. One was the actress Léonide Leblanc, more famous for her prominent liaisons than her histrionic talents, whose previous (or contemporary) *amant* was the immensely wealthy Duke of Aumale.[69] Miss Leblanc, incidentally, also had relations with Cornélius Herz of a nature sufficiently discreditable to permit Reinach on one occasion to attempt to thwart his blackmailer's pressures with a threat to expose "the Léonide Leblanc affair."[70] In a letter to Ernest Judet the socialist deputy Gustave Cluseret, like Clemenceau, a representative of the Var, estimated Clemenceau's annual expenditures at between 300,000 and 400,000 francs, figures which apparently included the costs of maintaining *La Justice*.[71]

Many persons wondered whence Clemenceau obtained the financial wherewithal to live in a style that would seem to have been prohibited by the 9,000 francs that he earned yearly for sitting in the Chamber. It was popularly believed that he had received a dowry of 800,000 francs with his American wife in 1869 (a recent writer, Albert Krebs, has argued, not absolutely convincingly, that this was a myth);[72] but, even if it had existed, there was little evidence of any such fortune when capitalizing *La Justice* in 1880 necessitated the sale of one of his father's farms.[73] Clemenceau did not respond to the speculation

about the sources of his wealth until the election campaign late in the summer of 1893. Then, he denied the very fact of his affluence, picturing himself to the voters as a man of restricted means and frugal living habits.[74]

La Justice was not the least of Clemenceau's financial involvements. As an economic venture, the publication of the newspaper had proven a failure. Listed in the *Annuaire de la presse française* of 1881 as having a circulation of 10,000 to 12,000,[75] it had thereafter experienced a drastic decline in its fortunes. On Clemenceau's own admission the value of its shares had diminished by four-fifths between 1883 and 1885.[76] In the late 1880's the circulation figure was no longer published in the *Annuaire*, but men of much journalistic experience such as Drumont, Judet, and Rochefort--all of whom could be classed as unfriendly towards Clemenceau--estimated that it was less than 3,000.[77] Deputy Paul Deschanel, anti-Radical and anti-socialist, described the newspaper to the Chamber as "sans abonnés, sans lecteurs, sans annonces;"[78] and, according to Judet, then the political editor of France's largest newspaper, *Le Petit Journal*, how *La Justice*, with its small readership, survived financially was long a mystery to local journalists.[79]

An explanation was provided at the time of the Panama scandal. On December 20, 1892, Déroulède declared that Herz had informed him before Clemenceau's arrival for their meeting in the fall of 1885 that he had given 400,000 francs to the Radical leader. Clemenceau had alleged that Herz's share-holdings in *La Justice* amounted to somewhat more than one-half of that figure.[80] Déroulède was less concerned about the discrepancy in the figures than the fact that Herz had

characterized his investment as a donation. Not that the figures were irrelevant, he added, for at their meeting in the previous February Herz had told Rochefort that supporting Clemenceau had cost him 2,000,000 francs.[81] Even Drumont's estimate of half a million francs, made in 1888, appeared small beside this allegation; yet, when Rochefort finally commented on the matter more than two months later, the story was even more sensational.

In *L'Intransigeant* of February 2, 1893, the exile published an article in which he claimed that during the dinner that he had had for Herz several days after dining with him and Clemenceau the financier had told him that subsidizing *La Justice* had cost him at least 3,500,000 francs.[82] Four years later Rochefort stated that on this occasion Herz had impressed him as being so evidently a consummate rascal that he did not put faith in anything that he said.[83] Nevertheless, he was sufficiently interested to pursue the matter. He arranged to dine again with Guillot, with whom he had had a long acquaintance. Guillot, as Herz's factotum, boasted that he knew more about his employer's affairs than he did himself. In the presence of at least one witness Rochefort put the question to Guillot, who answered that Herz's disbursements to Clemenceau totalled nearer 4,000,000 francs and that they had never ceased. Rochefort offered to supply to the Commission irrefutable proofs that these conversations had transpired as he said.[84] A lively discussion about how best to obtain his testimony ensued in the press of Paris.

Clemenceau responded to Rochefort's allegations by publishing in *La Justice* a disdainful comment portraying them as being of a piece with other foolish or unproven charges against him. It was more than

grotesque, it was odious, that such a contention could be made when every newspaper office in Paris knew the troublesome financial situation of *La Justice*. His newspaper, he added, could not even have absorbed such sums.[85] After Rochefort had replied that he could not, of course, know whether or not Herz's story was true, and that he was merely functioning as a "phonograph" in repeating it, Clemenceau offered to resolve the issue by submitting the financial records of his newspaper to the Commission of Inquiry.[86]

Conservative member Fernand de Ramel put a motion to the Commission to send a delegation to receive Rochefort's testimony (and to endeavour to interview Herz), but it was defeated by a vote of 13 to 5.[87] Chairman Brisson was adamant in his opposition to the idea of interrogating witnesses "sur les faits absoluments étrangers à l'affaire de Panama."[88] Nor did the Commission accept Clemenceau's offer to make available for examination the books of *La Justice*. Rochefort is a controversial figure whose word cannot be accepted as fact. Some of his contemporaries regarded him as a man whose integrity was beyond question;[89] others considered him to be a "maniaque de mensonge."[90] A recent biographer has indicated that, although Rochefort was personally convinced of his own perfect propriety and virtue, there is much evidence to suggest his unreliability.[91] Nevertheless, many persons accepted his testimony about his encounters with Herz. The Commission of Inquiry of 1897 regarded it seriously, although the subject of Clemenceau's involvement with Herz was not broached during the course of the deposition that Rochefort, returned from his exile, made to the body at that time.[92] Cluseret described the story of Herz's millions as a solution to the enduring mystery of

how a man with the Radical leader's means could live as indulgently as he did and publish a "readerless" daily newspaper,[93] and a newspaper in Clemenceau's electoral district pronounced the deputy irredeemably lost as a result of Rochefort's declarations.[94]

That Herz had the financial wherewithal to have subsidized *La Justice* to the extent suggested by Rochefort is indisputable: between 1886 and 1892 his blackmail of Reinach yielded him over 9,000,000 francs.[95] Nor can his willingness to expend such sums where the chance of gaining political influence be contended. Barely acquainted with Déroulède and Rochefort, he offered them large sums of money (300,000 francs in the latter case);[96] although he was Jewish himself, he lent 20,000 francs to the most prominent anti-Semite of the day, Édouard Drumont, in order to permit one of his collaborators to settle a gambling debt.[97]

Some reinforcing evidence for Rochefort's testimony was subsequently produced. In lieu of a delegation from the Commission, *Le Figaro* interviewed two of his witnesses in London, a maid and an art-dealer named Coureau, who confirmed that the conversations had occurred as he claimed.[98] Also, some doubt was cast on the validity of Clemenceau's contention--which conflicted with Rochefort's information--that Herz's financial involvement with *La Justice* had terminated in 1885. The Radical leader supported his claim by means of the note that he had had published in his newspaper to refute the suspicions that were being voiced about his connections with Herz during Boulanger's ministry (see above, pp. 18 ff.). Clemenceau carried this document with him when he first went before the Commission on December 14, 1892, as well as in March of the following year when he was summoned to testify

at the trial for parliamentary corruption. On the second of these occasions the veracity of the note was challenged by Henri Barboux, the lawyer of defendant Charles de Lesseps (son of Ferdinand), who had been the vice-president of the Panama Company. Barboux read to the court the following excerpt from a letter written by Reinach to Herz:

> La Banque refuse de prendre le papier de la *Justice* de sorte que je ne puis pas le proposer et je n'ai pas d'argent, parce que vous l'avez tout pris. Mais j'aurais 25.000 francs samedi et pourrai les remettre directement à *votre ami*, ainsi que je le fais avec vous, parce que je ne sais pas si ce papier de la *Justice* a de valeur ou non.[99]

The epistle was dated, significantly, April 4, *1886*. Barboux asked for an explanation, forcing Clemenceau to alter his previous stand on when Herz had ceased dealing with his newspaper. The Radical leader maintained, still, that Herz's shareholding had ended in 1885 as previously stated, but allowed that Herz had functioned as the banker for *La Justice* "jusqu'à septembre ou octobre 1886."[100] This was a fact that he had never revealed before. Nor was it mentioned in the note from *La Justice*--explicitly written to clarify these relationships only two or three months after Herz supposedly stopped functioning as the newspaper's "banker." While it did not vindicate Rochefort's contention that Guillot had said that Herz had never ceased subsidizing *La Justice*, the incident left the impression that Clemenceau had not been above distorting the truth in his eagerness to dissociate himself in the minds of his interrogators from Herz's business dealings.

Considering the amicable relations between Herz and Clemenceau and the involvement of *La Justice* in the discussion, the friend referred to in Reinach's letter was possibly the Radical leader himself. He was

not queried on the matter, and it was never settled. However, were this the case, Clemenceau would have been in the extremely compromising position of a receiver of funds--to be delivered, it should be observed, regardless of whether the paper in question was sold or not--from a man being blackmailed through the mediation of his blackmailer. The issue of the position of Clemenceau relative to the illicit connection between the two financiers was further complicated by his being among two persons (the other was Henry Maret, whose motives for his having contradicted previous judgments by issuing a report favorable to the lottery project in 1888 were suspected) considered by the Commission as the mysterious individual referred to under the pseudonym "Marot" in the correspondence that Reinach had with Chabert on the subject of transferring monies to Herz.[101] The Radical leader did have an apartment on Clement *Marot* Street during the period in question.[102] Chabert was interrogated on the matter, but refused to identify "Marot."[103] In 1897 the second Commission was unable to locate Chabert, and the secret of the real name of "Marot" was kept.

If speculation about the actual character of Clemenceau's financial connections with Herz proceeded on varying levels of credibility, one fact was certain--that for a period of approximately four years before 1885 Herz had put sizeable sums of money into *La Justice*. Clemenceau's remarks following a demand for an explanation of this circumstance in the Chamber of Deputies by Déroulède implied that Herz had merely been making a financial investment in the expectation of a profitable financial return: "Voulez-vous me dire, monsieur Déroulède, pourquoi les actionnaires en donnent aux journaux?" Unconvinced, Déroulède retorted sarcastically, "Ils sont bien des bêtes;"[104]

he could not believe that the shrewd Herz had persisted in his folly for four years, ultimately losing (as Clemenceau had stated days before) 200,000 francs of a 250,000-franc investment.[105] The financier must have gotten something out of the deal--but what? Was there any evidence that Clemenceau had prostituted his political activities to Herz's business designs? There was a great deal of loose talk about this matter during the Panama scandal, but some of the charges laid against Clemenceau are deserving of consideration, at least. Apart from the Boulanger intrigue, he was alleged to have acted in Herz's interest on at least two specific occasions: during the debates on Egypt in the early 1880's and during the throes of the Panama Company in 1888.

French industry had built the Suez Canal; but, owing to the strategic position of the waterway in relation to India and the fact that the preponderance of the maritime traffic that it carried was of British registration, Britain, as well, had a major interest in the region. It was Britain's policy to counterbalance French influence and to ensure that stability was preserved in the area. In 1875 Disraeli managed to purchase a large block of Canal shares from the debt-ridden khedive; English interests obtained a controlling investment in the 1880's. In June 1882 about fifty Europeans were massacred in Alexandria and Egyptian nationalists began constructing defense installations around the harbour. After France turned down a British proposal for a joint naval bombardment of these installations, Britain carried out the action herself. In spite of France's official abstinence, on July 19 the Chamber, by a vote of 424 to 64, approved the issuing of an extraordinary credit of 7,835,000 francs to the Ministry of Marine and Colonial Affairs to deal with the crisis. Gambetta advocated the measure (though deeming the sum insufficient), declaring himself a sincere friend of England, "mais non pas jusqu'à leur sacrifier les intérêts français." Clemenceau cast his vote for the credit, but opposed any actual intervention in Egypt on

the ground that the superior-race theories upon which colonialism was predicated were inconsistent with the principles of universal justice enunciated during the Great Revolution.[106]

When, ten days later, Freycinet requested a further credit of 9,400,000 francs to outfit an expedition, the project wrecked in the Chamber. Clemenceau, evincing, in the words of historian Jacques Chastenet, an "étrange myopie" in denying the importance of Mediterranean Africa to general European political issues,[107] was the principal opponent of the measure. On this occasion his argument rested more on pragmatic considerations than principles. Freycinet's plan of limited intervention, he contended, was the most humiliating course that the nation could pursue: it could result in Egyptian forces attacking French troops with impunity. Clemenceau also alleged that the cabinet had not made certain information that was relevant to the situation accessible to the Chamber, a fact whose logical consequence was that no deputy could responsibly vote for intervention. This argument elicited from the benches on the Right the exclamation that, "La politique d'intervention a disparu!" The Radical leader's speech concluded with an appeal to a higher interest, warning that the international situation was explosive, that Europe was covered with soldiers, and that France would be provoking a general war by sending troops into Egypt. The Chamber, completely reversing its previous judgment, rejected the request for the credit by a vote of 416 to 75 and brought down the cabinet.[108] On the following day the Paris correspondent of *The Times* of London commented: "Yesterday's vote can have but one signification. It shelves France, and doubtless for a long time, from all international activity. . . . . . . by Europe's

tacit consent England has just purchased [with its countrymen's blood] the right to an exclusive protectorate over Egypt."[109] The successors of the first forces that Britain despatched to Egypt in 1882 did not quit that country until 1955.

How influential Clemenceau had actually been in allowing England a free hand is debatable. Whereas Freycinet's memoirs describe his speech as "foudroyant"[110] and Jacques Chastenet agrees that it had "ébranlé" his fellow deputies,[111] Guy Chapman attributes importance to the fact that several cabinet ministers opposed intervention (Freycinet denied this), along with the two service chiefs.[112] However, the study of Baron Reinach's confiscated correspondence led to a rather different appraisal of the situation by the authors of the *Rapport général* of 1898, who concluded that the loss of French influence in Egypt to the British turned on "une affaire et rien qu'une affaire." Several months after Clemenceau's performance in the Chamber, Reinach was arranging for the sale of a sufficient number of Suez shares to give English investors control of the canal.[113] At the time, it should be recalled, Herz and Reinach were close business associates and Herz's advances to Clemenceau for the sustenance of *La Justice* were running into hundreds of thousands of francs.

It does seem possible that Clemenceau's real motives, whatever they were, for participating so energetically in the Egypt debate were not those that he proclaimed in his speeches at the time. Nowhere evident, at any rate, was any concern for the preservation of native liberties or the threat of escalating war in 1892, when in the Chamber he advocated more efficient conduct of the French military expedition then engaged in the subjugation of Dahomey. Look to the future, he

advised: "Un jour peut-être nous ferons une très grande expédition militaire, la plus grande de toutes." A mystifying policy reversal, indeed.[114]

Somewhat less nebulous than the Egyptian question was the alleged intervention of Clemenceau in a facet of the Panama intrigue six years later. In the fall of 1885 Cornélius Herz made a remarkable proposal to the administrators of the financially foundering Panama Company. The reasons for which his approaches were not rebuffed, Charles de Lesseps said, were that he possessed the credentials of a commander in the *Légion d'honneur* and that his position as "gros actionnaire de la *Justice*" (no longer so, according to Clemenceau), whose director, Clemenceau, was a serious candidate for the premiership (in fact, President Grévy offered him the position after the resignation of Brisson in December), made him a man whose enmity it would have been impolitic to arouse.[115] As a result, Herz had concluded a contract with the Company: in return for his making "toutes les démarches utiles et nécessaires" for assuring parliamentary approval of the lottery loan, he would receive 10,000,000 francs.[116]

In accordance with a pre-arrangement, this contract was physically destroyed in 1887.[117] However, Herz, whose receipts from the Panama Company had been only 600,000 francs, was dissatisfied that its terms were not fulfilled, especially after passage of the lottery loan. He applied pressure to Reinach.[118] The Baron in turn went to Charles de Lesseps about the end of May 1888, declaring that his dealings with Herz made it absolutely necessary that he obtain 10,000,000 to 12,000,000 francs. He had heart palpitations, he said, and feared that he would die.[119] De Lesseps gave him slightly less

than 5,000,000 francs (the backing against which Reinach wrote his July cheques), refusing his requests for more.

It was then, said de Lesseps, that he became the object of the importunings of a number of prominent politicians, including Clemenceau.[120] On July 12, 1888, a functionary in the Ministry of War asked him to call on his superior, Freycinet. Several days before, Freycinet had been visited by Clemenceau and Arthur Ranc, who had expressed concern about rumours that Baron Reinach was intending to sue the Panama Company. "Ces messieurs me firent observer qu'un pareil procès, dans les circonstances actuelles, était de nature à entrainer de sérieux inconvenients à la fois au point de vue de la chose publique et au point de vue même des intérêts des porteurs de titres de Panama," explained Freycinet, adding that he had merely suggested to de Lesseps that the situation be given more consideration before it be allowed to produce such undesirable consequences. He denied that Herz's name had been mentioned. De Lesseps' story was rather different: he said that Herz had definitely been discussed and that Freycinet, while denying his interest in Reinach's affairs, had asked him to try to arrange something for the Baron.

Clemenceau was the next politician with whom de Lesseps discussed Reinach's situation. Again the accounts of the encounter were at variance. De Lesseps claimed that the Radical leader had requested that he visit him, that upon his arrival Clemenceau had mentioned that Herz had informed him that he would be coming, that the Reinach issue had been raised--in a casual manner, that Herz had been mentioned, and that Clemenceau had told him, without being at all insistent, "C'est à vous à voir ce que vous pouvez faire." On the other hand, Clemenceau

contended that de Lesseps had come to him on his own initiative and that his words to the entrepreneur had been, "C'est à vous à voir ce que vous *voulez* faire."

Subsequently, Floquet, the Radical Minister of the Interior, summoned de Lesseps to his offices. He was excited about the situation of Reinach, but, on being informed that the Company would not accede to his demands for more money, he agreed with the correctness of de Lesseps' stand.

In a *sauve-qui-peut* such as the Panama affair, it is difficult to determine whose accounts of these conversations were true. Clemenceau, Freycinet, and Floquet had all been compromised in the scandal, and were undoubtedly concerned that the seriousness of their respective situations should not be increased. Indeed, when Clemenceau had first been interrogated *in camera* on these matters by Judge Franqueville, *La Justice* had falsely reported that its director was merely being called on to repeat what he knew of Reinach's last hours.[121] Yet, as Charles de Lesseps was the participant in these conversations most deeply involved in the scandal from a legal standpoint, his testimony must be treated with, if anything, even greater caution. On certain questions of chronology his memory was demonstrably faulty.

The uncontested fact was that the three politicians had been endeavouring to ameliorate the delicate predicament of Baron de Reinach, a circumstance that gave rise to many questions. Did they know of the parliamentary corruption in connection with the lottery loan? Were they, perhaps, aware of the real nature of the bond between Reinach and Herz? Republican deputy Alfred Letellier, arguing

in the Chamber that more stringent measures be taken to discourage the press from divulging confidential information--again, *Le Figaro* had been responsible for the initial revelation, obtaining a transcript of the Franqueville interrogation through some leak in security and deeming its illegal publication worth the risk of a nominal fine--described the facts that had been uncovered as casting discredit on the politicians involved.[122] A commentator in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, after asserting that in their confrontation with Charles de Lesseps on the matter before the assize court of Paris the politicians' testimony had been received with a perceptible skepticism, wondered, ". . . quel intérêt d'état il y avait à prévenir un procès que les chefs de la compagnie de Panama ne redoutaient pas."[123]

Clemenceau, Floquet, and Frecinet were not without an answer. They maintained that their concern had been generated by the fact of the contemporary development of the "Boulanger crisis."[124] After losing his portfolio, General Boulanger had become the focal point of a campaign of ill-defined constitutional revision with both Left- and Right-wing--and, briefly, much popular--support. In fact, Floquet and Clemenceau had been in the forefront of the opponents of the phenomenon of "Boulangism," which they regarded as a form of neo-Bonapartism. Clemenceau was the leading spirit in the formation in May 1888 of an anti-Boulangist *Société des droits de l'homme et du citoyen;* both he and Floquet had spoken against Boulanger's proposed reforms in the Chamber on June 4, and Floquet had wounded the General in a duel.[125] Placed in historical context, then, their explanations of their intervention on Reinach's behalf in mid-1888 are perfectly credible.

What cast a shadow of doubt over the adequacy of this

explanation was the fact that, merely two days before Clemenceau and Ranc first visited Freycinet, Herz had sent the following telegraph to Panama Company administrator Marius Fontane: "Votre ami [obviously Reinach] cherche à tricher. Il faut qu'il paye ou saute et, s'il saute, ses amis sauteront avec lui. Je briserai tout, plutôt que d'être volé d'un centime. Avisez, car il n'est que temps."[126] Clemenceau's political opponents alleged at the time of the Panama scandal that there was a connection between the reception of these threats and the Freycinet visit. This judgment has since been upheld by several historians. Jean Bouvier quotes Adrien Dansette to the effect that the politicians had acted as Herz's "courtiers," identifying the "amis" of Herz that Reinach, in a letter to Chabert of November 1888, complained were pressuring him as Clemenceau, Freycinet, and Floquet.[127] However, less certainty, perhaps, pertains to these matters than Bouvier indicates.

The possibility that Clemenceau had intervened on Reinach's behalf as a consequence of Herz's threat to "smash everything" if his demands for money were not satisfied reinforced the belief held by some persons that Herz, the blackmailer, had something on the Radical leader himself. Applauded "sur divers bancs," Millevoye expressed his thoughts to the Chamber as follows:

> M. Clemenceau pouvait demander honorablement, devant la cour d'assises, pardon du mal qu'il a fait par l'intermédiaire de Cornélius Herz à la République et au pays. S'il ne l'a pas fait--et il ne l'a pas fait,--nous sommes en droit de conclure qu'hier commandité de Cornélius Herz, il est encore aujourd'hui son prisonnier.[128]

This view was in accord with the popular notion that the real reason for which Herz was not extradited from England was not that he was

immovable in consequence of illness (the official justification) but that many influential French politicians feared that he would reveal information embarrassing to them. This assessment of the situation was made by Andrieux,[129] whose opinions were better informed than most.

However, for all one knows, Andrieux, a wily manipulator (more mischievous than a barrel of monkeys, said former Premier Jules Ferry), could have been propagating this view at Herz's behest. The financier himself repeatedly hinted that he could immolate a number of prominent reputations. In January 1893 he allowed *Figaro* reporter Calmette to examine samples that he had taken with him when he quit France of his correspondence with eminent scientists and politicians.[130] In the course of a long interview with Calmette a year later he made the following remarks:

> J'ai connu nombre de députés et de ministres, sans parler des sénateurs; alors, quand je me compare à quelques-uns d'entre eux dont je connais les actes et dont j'ai racheté les erreurs, j'ai une idée encore plus haute de ma propre personnalité. . . . Il y a tant de collégues de Baïhaut qui devraient être encore ses collégues dans la prison d'Étampes. . . .[131]

As late as 1897, after a British magistrate had ruled that there were no grounds for his extradition, Herz offered to testify in England before the second Commission of Inquiry, telling two delegates from that body that he had "des choses énormes à révéler."[132] The interrogation was cancelled when Herz imposed conditions upon it that the Commission found unacceptable. What awful secrets, if any, his papers contained was never revealed. In the early 1930's his daughter refused historian Bruno Weil access to them.[133]

An intriguing further comment on the controversy surrounding

Herz's papers, especially as they related to Clemenceau, was made in a document written many years after the Panama scandal. In 1930 Joseph Caillaux, former Premier and, it should be borne in mind, no friend of Clemenceau, whose government had had him imprisoned during the First World War, made an addition to his memoirs in the form of a footnote in which he declared that in a recent conversation with Doumer, subsequently President of the Republic, the following interesting facts had come to light. Doumer had been Finance Minister in the Radical cabinet of Léon Bourgeois from 1895 to 1896. He told Caillaux that during that period some of Herz's papers (whose import was not specified) had been discovered that compromised Clemenceau so seriously that an order had been issued for his arrest. However, Bourgeois had personally intervened, convincing the rest of the cabinet that the image of the Republic had already suffered too much as a result of the Panama revelations to permit the issue to be re-opened, and the incident was hushed up.[134] Bourgeois had been accused of similar activities before: in March 1893 he was forced to resign his post as Minister of Justice under suspicion that he had been the inventor of measures taken to cover up the initial scandal. Neither he nor Doumer was living when Caillaux's memoirs were published.

Clemenceau's intervention on Reinach's behalf (or more accurately, perhaps, Herz's) in 1888 was not the only indication turned up during the Panama investigations that the Radical leader could have known more about the shady relations of Reinach and Herz than he allowed. The list of corrupted parliamentarians, and others, that Reinach had drawn up for Cornélius Herz and that had been obtained from the latter individual by Louis Andrieux in December 1892 and

deposited with the Commission was obviously not in the Baron's handwriting. Andrieux testified that Herz had told him that the note had been dictated by Reinach, and that the transcriber could probably be found among the Baron's past secretarial staff.[135] The testimony of a banker named Propper revealed that one of the employees of his bank had served Reinach in that capacity for a period of time.

On January 18, 1893, the man, Paul Stēphan, made his first deposition to the Commission of Inquiry. He had, indeed, he said, on one occasion been dictated a list by Reinach. He would not definitely affirm that it was the one published in the newspapers (that is, Andrieux's list), although he recollected some of the names and the large sums inscribed opposite them.[136] The following day, on being shown a photocopy of the list and apprehending that it was in his handwriting, he made a positive statement that it was, in fact, the one that Reinach had dictated to him, in, he estimated, early spring 1890.[137]

Besides establishing the authenticity of the list (a fellow employee testified that Stēphan had mentioned it to him before the end of 1890), Stēphan's testimony proved rather embarrassing for Clemenceau. When Reinach had finished his dictation, he said, he told him to address an envelope to the Radical leader, put the note into it, and deliver it to Clemenceau's residence. Stēphan complied with these instructions.[138]

The bank clerk's assertions resulted in the Commission's immediately summoning Clemenceau to elucidate the incident. Brisson, the chairman, gave him a resumē of Stēphan's testimony, particularly with regard to how it involved him. Clemenceau requested, and was

provided with, a copy of Andrieux's note. He perused it, then declared that he was absolutely certain that he had never received any such document. Had he, he added, he would not have accepted it.[139]

This deposition had a curious subsequent history. After reading and approving the stenographic text, Clemenceau refused to append his signature to the final draft. The insistence that he do so of several of the Commission members could not alter his resolve. He did not question the accuracy of the text, and he would not specify any corrections that he wished to make. He was, he maintained, merely standing for the principle that it was unfair that, should witnesses desire to change their testimony, the convention followed by the archivist of the Commission compelled them to commit their modifications to a separate piece of paper, "qui peut être enlevée par malveillance ou par accident," before they appeared in footnotes to the *procès-verbal*.[140] Clemenceau had not manifested any such recalcitrance over the signing of his previous deposition to the Commission.

Initially, the Radical leader defended himself against the implications of Stéphan's testimony by disputing its overall plausibility. His comments in *La Justice* were as follows:

> Donc, voici la dernière trouvaille:
> En 1890, M. le baron de Reinach éprouve la besoin de me livrer les chefs de son parti. Pourquoi? On n'en sait rien. A cet effet, il dicte à un jeune commis de banque--qui n'est pas même à son service--une note où il formule contres ses meilleurs amis les accusations les plus graves, avec chiffres à l'appui. Après quoi, il envoie ledit commis se promener par la ville, muni de la pièce en question, sans lui avoir demandé le secret, sans lui avoir donné l'ordre de remettre l'écrit en mains propres. La raison de tous ces actes, on l'ignore. Personne n'essaye de les expliquer.[141]

Clemenceau did draw attention to one apparently clear inaccuracy in

Stéphan's account. The bank clerk had described the stair-head at his apartment as "assez vaste." On the contrary, said Clemenceau, it is full of furniture.[142]

Still this was a rather slender rebuttal. It could hardly have been expected to abate speculation about the significance of Stéphan's allegations. Clemenceau recognized the need for further contestation.

Six days after the first appearance of Stéphan before the Commission, Clemenceau requested permission to make another deposition. Previous to the bank clerk's testimony, he said, the journalist Georges Labruyère had been told by a friend that an employee of the Propper bank was going to make a deposition that would prove troublesome for Clemenceau. The whole episode was, therefore, concluded the Radical leader, "un coup préparé dans un certain milieu politique." He refused to specify the *milieu* to which he was referring.[143] Labruyère substantiated his story.[144]

That there is even any relevance to this testimony is debatable. Stéphan had said earlier that he had discussed the matter with his co-workers a month before--although the individual to whom he made special reference could not recall Clemenceau's name having been mentioned.[145] Labruyère cast umbrage on his own veracity by refusing both to take the Commission's oath to tell the truth and to sign his deposition; but, in any case, there is no necessity for its correctness presupposing a political plot. The idea is also refuted by the seemingly accidental way in which Stéphan happened to become a witness. He swore that Clemenceau's allegations were false.[146]

If, indeed, Stéphan was lying, it is strange that he did not attempt to damn Clemenceau more thoroughly than he did. He was even

willing to admit the possibility--with strong reservations--of having delivered the note to the wrong apartment.[147] Of the intended destination, however, he was certain. A fellow employee attested both his reliability and his honesty; he said that ten years' acquaintance with Stêphan had given him the conviction that he was a man incapable of uttering a word that was untrue.[148]

Stêphan's story was given an indirect confirmation a year later by Cornélius Herz himself. From a sick-bed in England Herz made the following statement to Gaston Calmette, who, coincidentally, was the *Figaro* reporter who had first revealed Clemenceau's excursions with Reinach and Rouvier on the day before the Baron's death. Herz was explaining how it had been Clemenceau who had requested from him the list that Reinach had dictated to Stêphan in 1890:

> Oui, c'est Clemenceau, dans un but que je ne connais pas encore, et pour détourner peut-être les ennuis qu'il prévoyait en raison de l'amitié que je lui avais si longtemps portée. Donc, en décembre 1892, aprés le discours de M. Delahaye, qui ne contenait aucune preuve et aucun document, mais qui émettait simplement des soupçons sur le rôle des députés dans le Panama, *Clemenceau, qui savait depuis longtemps que j'avais parmi mes dossiers la liste de quelques-uns des chèques parlementaires,* m'envoya son ami Andrieux à Bournemouth, en me priant de lui confier cette liste. Il s'engageait formellement à ne la montrer qu'à M. Bourgeois, ministre de la justice, pour lui indiquer le danger qu'il y avait à continuer cette affaire. J'avais à cette époque des relations trop cordiales et trop intimes avec le directeur de la *Justice* pour lui refuser un pareil service, et je confiai sur l'heure à son envoyé, non point l'original du document (le voici ici) mais la photographie de ce document. Il y avait engagement d'honneur à le tenir secret. Quel ne fut pas mon étonnement de trouver deux jours après cette photographie dans la *Libre Parole*, puis, le 22 décembre, cette même photographie entre les mains de la commission d'enquête, à laquelle l'avait remise Andrieux![149]

It should be remarked that a year before Herz had given Calmette a very different story. On that occasion the banker had expressed his

regret that his friendship with Clemenceau was causing the Radical leader political embarrassment: "Est-ce qu'en donnant mes papiers à M. Andrieux, je n'ai pas suffisamment marqué mon indépendance vis-à-vis de telles ou telles coteries politiques?"[150]

Herz's line of argument at that time had been less than convincing, for in fact Louis Andrieux and Georges Clemenceau had been good friends for many years. Their amity had been established in the last years of the Second Empire, when both were active through their connections with the radical press in journalistic warfare on the regime of Louis Napoleon. Nearly sixty years later, Andrieux penned his recollections of the days when he and Clemenceau had been students together, one pursuing law and the other medicine, thus: ". . . nous vécumes côté à côté, liés d'une solide amitié, que les dissentiments inévitables d'une longue carrière n'ont jamais ébranlé."[151] He described himself as the d'Artagnan of that trio of deputies of high repute as duellists in the political Left--Lockroy, Perrin, and Clemenceau--who were known as "the Three Musketeers;" Clemenceau had taught him the use of the pistol.[152] As they matured politically, their friendship endured. In 1882 Clemenceau used Andrieux, whom he caused to be appointed to draft the report of the commission established to study the government's proposed constitutional revisions, as an instrument in the destruction of the ministry presided over by Léon Gambetta.[153]

In view of their past relations it is conceivable that, as Herz alleged, at the time that the Panama scandal broke Andrieux was acting either under orders from, or in conjunction with, the Radical leader. The fact that Andrieux was a professed "Revisionist" was no

insuperable barrier to their collaboration, for, as has been shown above, Clemenceau was amenable to the formation of an alliance with the Revisionist Henri Rochefort, and Andrieux had been one of the intermediaries through whom a meeting between the two men was arranged. Further, it was almost certainly Andrieux (or, possibly, Herz) who initiated Clemenceau to the secret of the loan that Drumont had negotiated from Herz, the existence of which the Radical leader was the first to reveal to the public.

Both Andrieux and Clemenceau responded with vigorous denials to Herz's allegation that they had cooperated in obtaining Reinach's list from him.[154] But was Herz's story not the perfect explanation of the incident in January of the previous year when, testifying before the Commission of Inquiry, Andrieux had said that a few days or the day before he had delivered his list to the Commission in December he had shown it to Clemenceau? On being queried as to his motives for having so honoured the Radical leader he replied that he had been talking with Clemenceau after having procured the list, and that he had shown it to him exactly as he would have to any other acquaintance.[155] However, there seems to have been more to the matter than this. One of the names on Andrieux's list had been purposely obliterated. No one who knew ever revealed whose it was, and his identity, like that of "Marot," remains mysterious. All that Andrieux would tell the Commission was that the enigmatic "X," so-called, in his list was a deputy. He excused himself from naming the mysterious personnage on the ground that he had sworn on his honour to Herz to identify him to no one. Yet Clemenceau, in maintaining--as a proof (after Stéphan's testimony) that he did not have prior knowledge of the list--that

Andrieux had had to read it to him in order to enlighten him as to its contents, stated that the ex-deputy had admitted him to the secret of "X"'s identity.[156] Evidently, Clemenceau occupied a privileged position with respect to Andrieux's confidence. Recalled by the Commission, Andrieux could give no satisfactory explanation of what had nullified the oath of silence that he had invoked during his previous questioning. Two months later, several memebers of the Commission pressed him on the matter. Yielding to their persistence, Andrieux said, "Vous voulez me faire dire des choses que je n'ai pas voulu dire jusqu'ici," and stated that Herz had given him a special dispensation from honouring his oath with Clemenceau.[157] Apparently there was a coalition of sorts between Herz, Clemenceau, and Andrieux; the matter was not further clarified.

The cumulative effect of the revelations made during the Panama controversy of the compromising situations in which he had been involved was seriously to undermine Clemenceau's reputation for probity. Criticism of his activities reached such ferocious proportions that even former Premier Jules Ferry, whose own reputation had never fully recovered from the attacks on him in the Chamber in previous years by Clemenceau (who had publicly accused him of treason for his colonial policies), commiserated with him.[158] Rochefort's allegations early in February 1893 that Herz and Guillot had estimated the total sum of Herz's continuing subsidizations of Clemenceau's personal and political indulgences at nearly 4,000,000 francs seemingly tipped the scale in his disfavour. As a consequence of the exile's assertions, Premier Ribot later revealed, he, Ribot, had been the recipient of virtually daily petitions from deputies "of the centre" for the Radical

leader's arrest.[159] It cannot be known whether, had the order been issued, the Chamber would have lifted his immunity; however, there was, seemingly, no one, even among his close associates, willing to speak in his defense; and, on March 24, 1893, when the conservative deputy de Mahy pronounced *finis* to Clemenceau's political career as a result of the exposure of his connections with Herz, the Chamber burst into prolonged applause on "un grand nombre de bancs."[160] However, although Millevoye on one occasion threatened to move that the Chamber recommend that the case be sent into the courts, he did not carry out his threat, and Clemenceau survived these critical months without being legally arraigned.

On the basis of the available evidence it is impossible to pronounce a final verdict on the question of Clemenceau's ethical or criminal guilt--his awareness of or his involvement in Herz's criminal activities. However, both issues certainly warrant serious consideration. During the period when Herz was committing criminal acts--blackmailing Reinach and participating in the engineering of a plan for political bribery--Clemenceau had been continually in contact with him. The relationship had been maintained, with varying degrees of conspicuousness, in spite of much public comment and criticism, and Herz was apparently a presence in Clemenceau's political activities even after having fled to England following Reinach's death. Occasionally, Clemenceau's political maneuvres had been to Herz's business advantage. Although many years later, late in the 1920's, Clemenceau conceded that Herz was a "fripouille finie" who had successfully deceived him as to his real character,[161] as late as the election campaign in the fall of 1893 he could be found dilating on

Herz's past achievements and respectability. On one occasion in the Chamber he contended that the real reason for which Herz was being so severely critized was that he had been an opponent of Boulangism.[162]

When some of Rochefort's friends questioned the propriety of his having revealed his meeting in February 1892 with Herz and Clemenceau, he explained to them (so he said) that he would not have had he not feared that exposure of the incident by another party would put his own relations with Herz in a suspicious light. There was wisdom in this view. Clemenceau's approach had been very different: he had held himself in circumspect reserve until challenged to explain compromising incidents. Then, his explanations several times contradicted previous statements that he had made. To his political enemies secrecy implied guilt. Had he exposed voluntarily and in full, at the outset of the discovery of Herz's criminal activities, his connections with Herz, and if they were as innocent as he claimed, the accusations made of his culpability would have had considerably less effect than they did. Submitting himself thus to one strong bout of censure would have been less detrimental to his reputation than a series of charges assailing it over a number of months.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE TREASON THESIS

Although the evidence produced during the Panama investigations justified questioning the propriety--and even the legitimacy--of Clemenceau's backstairs political activities as they related to Herz, the controversy surrounding the issue soon departed from a factual basis. To the Radical leader's chief detractors, xenophobes and anti-Semites such as Déroulède and Millevoye, Stéphan's and de Lesseps' testimony had but peripheral relevance to the main issue. When certain of the ingredients of the case, particularly Herz's international connections and his subsidization of Clemenceau's political activities, entered into the cerebra of Déroulède and Millevoye, the evidence took on a novel significance: it indicated treason.

Ever since her humiliation in the Franco-Prussian War, France's national pride had been susceptible to a peculiar paranoia that manifested itself as a preoccupation with the harm to which their beaten and dismembered country was liable through the machinations of spies. The discovery during the years immediately preceding the Panama scandal that several Frenchmen had sold secrets to Germany aggravated this phobia. Spies were believed to be sabotaging the nation's efforts to restore her international prestige.[1] It was inevitable that Herz--criminal, foreigner, and Jew--should be charged with having functioned as a foreign agent.

As in the Dreyfus affair two years later, there were utterly no grounds for the accusation that Herz was a spy. However, he had

numerous international connections and his activities were held to have had a deleterious effect on the affairs of the country. These two "facts" were the essential components of the argument that he was the agent of a foreign power. They were sufficient to constitute a proof to men with the distortional preconceptions of Déroulède, Millevoye, and, apparently, many others.

For the first part of their "case" evidence abounded. Herz had, indeed, a great number of relations beyond the borders of France. His propensity for travelling abroad was remarked. Déroulède cited articles in the German socialist newspaper *Vorwaertz* reporting that Herz had made numerous short visits to Berlin during 1872, and a French newspaper alleged that he had a personal interview with Bismarck in 1887.[2] He had deposited the two 1,000,000-franc cheques that Reinach had written him in July 1888 with the Rothschild banking house at Frankfurt. It was also revealed that he possessed a Bavarian title and that only the fall of the cabinet of the Premier Francesco Crispi had prevented him from being further ennobled in Italy.[3] More sinister yet, Herz employed in his offices the sons of the Serbian and Italian ambassadors to France.[4] In view of his character, it is amazing that Herz had been able to establish such prominent connections, but the simple fact of their existence in no way justified the charge that he was a spy.

It was in answering the question of how Herz had harmed the interests of France that Clemenceau entered the issue. Basically, the thesis put forward was as follows. Herz had ensured that Clemenceau and his Radicals would be a force in French politics by financing their activities. The ultimate objective was realized when, as a result of the elections of 1885, the Radicals occupied a position in the Chamber

whereby they could at any time bring down the cabinet merely by voting with the Right opposition. Even before the Panama scandal Clemenceau had been reputed as a "destroyer of ministries," but now those whose falls he was believed to have engineered were said to have been object lessons to their successors. It was contended (so, at least, Maurice Barrès told Edmond de Goncourt in December 1892) that Clemenceau had a tacit understanding with the Opportunist cabinets that, regardless of his personal attacks on them, he would assure them his followers' support in the voting in the Chamber as long as the ministers did not contravene his will.[5] By thus terrorizing every cabinet into impotence, Clemenceau was held to have served the ends consciously intended by the foreign agent Herz. A political accident, the balance of forces in the Chamber, was made to appear as the fruition of some sinister plot.

So convinced were Déroulède and Millevoye that treachery was afoot somewhere, that they hardly paused to sort out which country's interests were being served. Herz was said to be a German spy; but, in refined subsequent versions of the argument, Clemenceau, because of his rôle in the Egyptian debates of 1882 and his professed opposition to the conclusion of a Franco-Russian defensive alliance, was alleged to be working for England. In spite of this contradiction and the seeming inanity of the whole thesis, that the proponents of this view were convinced of its validity can hardly be disputed. Accusing Clemenceau, one of the most respected duellists in Paris, of having committed treason was not to be undertaken lightly.

The theory that Clemenceau had been involved in treasonous activities was first propounded by Paul Déroulède in the Chamber on December 20, 1892. He characterized the Radical leader as Herz's

devoted and indefatigable intermediary, whose introducing of the financier to persons of political influence had been responsible for his attainment of such remarkable social and scientific successes. Clemenceau responded to Déroulède's suggestion that his career in the Chamber, littered with ruins, was connected with the fact of Herz's being a foreign agent by calling him a liar.[6] A deputy is reported to have told Déroulède as he regained his seat that Clemenceau would kill him; Déroulède replied that he deemed what he had just done worth the risk.[7]

Two days later accuser and accused faced each other on the duelling field. It was believed by everyone that Déroulède would be killed (even, apparently, by Déroulède)[8] and, according to Léon Daudet, the notice of his death had been typeset for several newspapers before the encounter even took place.[9] Each man fired three shots at the other without causing him any injury. *La Justice,* after having given front-page coverage to the preliminaries of the duel, did not even mention the outcome.

In January 1893 the rumour spread through Paris that Clemenceau was an English agent.[10] Some unidentified politician endeavoured to convince even Lockroy, Clemenceau's competitor for the leadership of the Radical faction, of the fact.[11]

A month later the concept, implicit in Déroulède's argument, that Clemenceau was the motive force of an "occult" government received unexpected support from two Republican deputies. On February 16, Godefroy Cavaignac and Paul Deschanel announced in the Chamber that the time had come for the body to rise above party differences and terminate an intolerable political situation. Cavaignac, who eight days previously,

had expressed concern that the cases against seven of the *chéquards* had been thrown out so facilely, now claimed that the real object of his earlier criticism was not the visible government, but that which was hidden. ". . . nous avons vu", he declared, "depuis dix ans tous les rouages du gouvernement parlementaire faussées par un gouvernement latent, irresponsable, nous avons vu des ministres subir, accepter et souvent humblement le joug de celui-là même qui attaquait plus violemment leurs idées." As he spoke he indicated with a gesture the bench where Clemenceau was seated. Deschanel's argument was similar. He contended that the elected majority should determine government policy--not Clemenceau's Radicals, who he contended were responsible for having overturned fifteen cabinets in sixteen years. He produced figures on the representation in the Chamber to demonstrate how Republican forces could govern without having to rely on Radical support.[12] In describing the incident, *La Justice* accused Cavaignac and Deschanel of having participated in a maneuvre conceived by the *Ralliement*, a Catholic group reconciled to functioning politically in a republican context, to oust Clemenceau from politics.[13] However, even after Clemenceau had lost his seat in the Chamber, Deschanel maintained the validity of his argument. In July 1894 he repeated in the Chamber that Clemenceau's politics had been ruinous to the effective operation of the government during the earlier years of the Third Republic.[14] Clemenceau called him a liar and a coward. A duel with swords ensued (Deschanel being technically the offended party), in which Deschanel was cut above an eye.

The thesis that Clemenceau's whole political career was a continuous act of treason was put forward by its different exponents with

varying degrees of affirmativeness, but it was given extremely wide public circulation. On March 22, 1893, the two million readers of the cheap daily *Le Petit Journal* perused an article in which Ernest Judet, grown impatient at the failure to bring Clemenceau to trial, pronounced his own verdict on the Radical leader's guilt. The article was entitled "Un Criminel." In it, Judet argued the importance of bringing to justice the foreigners who had betrayed France in the Panama affair; but he counselled against forgetting that they had had native Frenchmen as their collaborators. Of these, he contended that Clemenceau was the most notorious. It was not enough that Clemenceau's political career should be terminated (Judet had not the slightest doubt that it would be); the real issue was how long it was going to take to raise his parliamentary immunity and have him sentenced for his crimes.

> Il est bien à jamais l'associé historique de Cornélius Herz, et tout de qui dégrade le role de [l'espion allemand] retombe en plein sur lui.
>
> Mais il paraît qu'il est au-dessus des lois?
>
> Jusques à quand?[15]

Judet left the argument that Clemenceau was a traitor implicit, merely stating that, "Il est devenu par manie, par goût, par intérêt, un étranger sur notre sol."

No reliable evidence, whatever, was produced to substantiate the thesis of Clemenceau's treachery, and it soon became apparent that he had been made the scapegoat for circumstances caused by more fundamental weaknesses in the French constitution, for cabinets fell with equivalent frequency both during and after his career in the Chamber. Nevertheless, once originated, the story that Clemenceau was a foreign--specifically, English--agent was to dog him for the remainder of his

political life.[16]

CHAPTER FIVE

REPRIEVE

By any normal standard it would appear that the case for or against Clemenceau warranted further elucidation. The implications of the testimony produced during the Panama investigations were serious. Stéphan's and Charles de Lessep's statements had involved him in the most sensational of Herz's crimes--the parliamentary corruption and his blackmail of Baron de Reinach--and Rochefort's allegations across the Channel had suggested that there was a monetary rationale for such involvement. Yet, in spite of the seriousness of the circumstances and the insistence by several deputies that the matter belonged in the courts, the issues were never pursued to any kind of a conclusion: they were left suspended, as it were, denials nullifying assertions. From a juridical standpoint this situation possibly worked to Clemenceau's advantage. In any event, why the investigation into his relationships with Herz and Reinach terminated so inconclusively warrants an explanation.

There were several contributory factors. Most obvious, perhaps, was the presence of friends and political colleagues on the Commission who could direct the interrogations in a manner beneficial to Clemenceau's case. The Radical deputies Maujan (Clemenceau's duelling second) and Camille Pelletan (editor of *La Justice*) were helpful in this regard. Their interest and activity were noticeably increased when Clemenceau's reputation was threatened. For example, in the course of Ferdinand Martin's testimony before the Commission

Maujan elicited from him, with reference to the mention that he had made in his *Libre Parole* articles of Clemenceau's and Pelletan's being objects of the solicitations of the Panama Company, an expression of the opinion that neither had yielded to the temptations of corruption.[1] More important were Pelletan's persistence in questioning Stéphan in January 1893, which provided Clemenceau with material subject to legitimate rebuttal,[2] and the objections that Maujan raised to the pursuit of the allegations that Rochefort had made about Clemenceau's financial dependence upon Herz, which were responsible in part for the defeat of the motion made in the Commission to despatch the delegation to England that the exile had requested. Maujan argued that the Commission would exhaust its energies in such particularistic activities.[3]

However, at most the efforts of Maujan and Pelletan ameliorated Clemenceau's situation. They were in no position to alter fundamentally the nature of the investigations. The primary reason for which the cases of the Radical leader and others were not subjected to more rigorous investigation was that persons who were in positions to influence the actual thoroughness of the inquiry into the allegations made during the Panama affair were concerned that the scandal should be suppressed. From the outset pressures to stifle the affair were evident in political maneuvres and in the activities of the judiciary and the police. "On passa l'éponge," says Jean Bouvier, a recent student of the scandal.[3a]

On occasion the efforts to minimize the implications of the affair were almost comically clumsy. A police seizure of Baron de Reinach's papers was forestalled for three days, allowing his nephew

and son-in-law, Joseph, to destroy a great number.[4] The Sans-Leroy case was an even more amusing anomaly. It was not only that the former deputy was acquitted of the charge of having been the recipient of bribes, in spite of overwhelming evidence to indicate his guilt (being designated in both Reinach's and Arton's papers for a pay-off of 300,000 francs, having inexplicably reversed his attitude toward the lottery loan in 1888 from vocal opposition to equally vocal advocacy, and having his bank deposits increase shortly thereafter by 200,000 francs); but the same judges who exonerated Sans-Leroy from having accepted bribes condemned Arton *in absentia* to five years imprisonment for having bribed him.[5]

Several individuals, apparently with inside information on the government's approach toward the investigations, publicized their knowledge with sensational effect. During the corruption trial in March 1893, Mme Cottu, wife of one of the Company officials sentenced to imprisonment for swindling a month earlier, claimed that the head of the *Sûreté générale*, Soignoury, had told her in the preceding December that "the government" was anxious to terminate the scandal with no incriminations and one month later had guaranteed her husband's release on the condition of his compromising a deputy of the Right. Mme Cottu's allegations were, of course, suspect. However, Soignoury provided so pathetic a defense against her charges that he was actually hooted by the gallery in the court.[6] Officially, the incident was regarded as sufficiently serious to justify his immediate dismissal and also resulted in the resignation of the Minister of Justice, Léon Bourgeois. Allegations equally embarrassing to the cabinet were made by one Dupas, an investigator for the *Sûreté*. Arton had fled the country in the

summer of 1892 in order to avoid prosecution on a swindling charge. After the Panama exposures incriminated him further, Dupas was sent abroad to locate him, his efforts, shortly proving successful. However, in a pamphlet that he published in 1893 Dupas claimed that he had been given specific orders not to arrest Arton. The official explanation was that an inexperienced intermediary had confused his instructions. Nevertheless, Premier Ribot had repeatedly stated that Arton had not been located--a contention that was patently false. It seems unlikely that Ribot did not know the truth of the matter. When Dupas first revealed the fact of his having been impotent to arrest Arton, although in personal contact with him, he himself was arrested and held *incommunicado* for seventeen days--"une atteinte aussi grave portée aux principes essentiels qui sauvegardent la liberté individuelle," declared the *Rapport général* of 1898. He was subsequently tried for having harboured Arton from the law(!)--and acquitted.[7]

A further instance, if not of Ribot's duplicity, of his satisfaction with the superficial conduct of the Panama investigations, is the justification that he gave for never having pressed for Clemenceau's arrest: "Nous fîmes opérer des recherches à l'enrégistrement: ce constate que Cornélius, depuis 1885, était étranger à la *Justice*; il avait vendu ses actions. Que voulez-vous? j'étais désarmé."[8] This excuse was, in fact, none at all. As has been shown (see above, p. 35), even Clemenceau allowed that his financial involvement with Herz had not terminated until over a year later.

Fixing the responsibility for these attempts to cover up the scandal is a difficult task. After the fruitless round of trials for corruption in 1897, the Chamber of Deputies passed, unanimously, a

motion condemning the magistrature for allowing guilty parties to escape punishment.[9] However, in 1893, at least, no such definite attribution of blame was possible, for it was clear that politicians had participated in the covering up of incriminating evidence. It was a noteworthy characteristic of these activities that they apparently originated in part in an impulse to defend the value of the existing Republican political institutions, a cause to which petty political differences were, in general, subordinated. The same efforts were made to exonerate a Radical such as Clemenceau as a compromised Opportunist.

One excellent example of the cover-up technique was the *Rapport Général* written by deputy Vallé in 1893. Intended as a summary of the conclusions reached by the Commission of Inquiry, the document's apparent purpose was to vindicate--regardless of the sacrifice of scrupulosity necessitated--the virtue of the regime: Vallé's chief concern, obviously, was to undermine the evidence against the accused rather than to compile it and deduce fairly its implications. Clemenceau's case was treated in the same partial manner as that of every other compromised politician (with the exception of Baïhaut, whose confession of guilt had placed him outside of the pale of redemption). The brief commentary in Vallé's report completely ignored the question of Clemenceau's associations with Baron de Reinach and his blackmailer, Herz. It centred, instead, on the testimony of the bank clerk Stéphan, which it seemed almost excessively eager to render liable to doubt. On January 18, 1893, Stéphan had been unwilling to affirm that the list of *chéquards* published by various newspapers was that which Reinach had dictated to him three years before. The next day and subsequently, he

was certain that it was. Vallé held this variable affirmativeness to be grounds for questioning the clerk's reliability, disregarding the obvious fact that seeing a photograph of the list in his own handwriting at the beginning of the second day of his interrogation would quite understandably have convinced Stéphan that the list was definitely that which he had transcribed. *Rapporteur* Vallé closed his discussion of the Stéphan incident with two questions: one expressed wonder that, in view of the curious nature of the list, Stéphan had not drawn more attention to it in conversation with his friends (Reinach not having sworn him to secrecy on the matter); and the other pointed out that several of the names on the list would have been difficult to spell correctly from dictation, yet, "Chose remarquable! Il n'y a pas un erreur dans la liste que M. Stéphan écrivait sous la dictée du baron de Reinach."[10] This treatment gives the impression that Vallé was clutching at any available straw that might cast suspicion on the bank employee's testimony. Such points were worthy of mention, perhaps, but hardly of the emphasis that Vallé gave them. What he had done was make all of the complexities of the Clemenceau case seem contingent upon one simple contention, whose credibility he could then assail with speciously contrived arguments.

Vallé's report did not receive unanimous approval even among the members of the Commission. The nine conservative deputies in the body affixed an official protest of his conclusions to the document. "Il transforme en une affirmation positive le doute qui profite à l'accusé," they complained, not unfairly. With special pertinence to the Clemenceau case, they objected to the silence surrounding the

question of the awareness of the blackmail bond between Herz and Reinach seemingly possessed by several politicians and the total absence of comment on the "démarches étranges" that had preceded Reinach's death.[11]

It should be recalled that Vallé's report was issued several months after the parliamentary corruption trial of March 1893, in which all of the accused had been acquitted, save Baïhaut. Vallé drew heavily on these earlier judicial absolutions from guilt of the compromised politicians. The previous considerations, in turn, were largely based on the individual dossiers prepared by preliminary examining Judge Franqueville. His work, the fount of much of the exculpation, warrants critical attention. It was Franqueville who threw out half of the cases against the *chéquards* before they ever reached the courts. Some indication of the cavalier manner of his approach is afforded by the fact that he also dismissed the first case against Herz for blackmail,[12] although possessed of the same evidence as that which eventually earned the financier a five-year sentence on the charge.

Of course, there were protestations of Franqueville's handling of the evidence in 1893. That these were at least in some measure justified became evident in 1897, when the socialist deputy Gustave Rouanet, as a member of the new commission, was enabled to subject the judge's dossiers to critical scrutiny. Commenting upon the strange silence surrounding the relations of political figures with Panama Company officials, he observed that Franqueville had abstracted several documents of importance to the subject from public and judicial purvey. For example, in the correspondence that had been seized there were

three letters showing Rouvier thick in planning the passage of the lottery loan with representatives of the Company. Franqueville had thrown out the Rouvier case without making reference to them.[13] Rouanet was even more critical of the ordinance of *non-lieu* issued in the case of deputy Jules Roche. With as much tact as was possible under the circumstances, Rouanet revealed that in arriving at his judgment Franqueville had relied entirely on evidence whose absolute falseness was manifest from previous testimony.[14] One of the letters that Franqueville had consigned to oblivion actually did directly involve Clemenceau, although hardly in a compromising manner. In 1885 Herz had arranged for Clemenceau to meet with Ferdinand de Lesseps over a meal in order to discuss an entrepreneurial promotion, but company administrator Fontane described the encounter as having "réussi mal."[15]

Interestingly, on one occasion in 1893 Franqueville was charged with deliberately covering up evidence bearing on the Clemenceau case. On March 31, the Marquis de Morès, Drumont's collaborator in *La Libre Parole* and the friend for whom the anti-Semite had borrowed money from Herz, made a voluntary deposition before the Commission of Inquiry. Among other things, he contended that when Chabert had been privately interrogated by Franqueville the question of the identity of "Marot" had been posed and Chabert had identified him as Clemenceau, but that both question and answer were deleted from the transcript of the session. Morès supplied no source for this information, but did furnish an explanation for the alleged incident. He claimed that he had been told by one Evans, Franqueville's dentist, that the judge complained of being under enormous pressure from "the government" to prevent Clemenceau's

inculpation.[16]

Morès had a sleeveful of accusations for every occasion, and his veracity was suspect. The Commission treated him with great courtesy, but it did not pursue his assertions. *Le Figaro* dismissed the matter after interviewing a dentist named Thomas W. Evans who said that he had never had anything to do with either Morès or Franqueville.[17] However, several days later a *Temps* reporter located the right dentist Evans, John, who confirmed that Franqueville had complained to him that he had indeed been subjected to pressures (he did not specifically relate these to the Clemenceau case) and that if these continued he would resign his post because he had had enough. Franqueville, also, was interviewed. While expressing his high esteem for his dentist, he denied that he had been pressured by any member of the government.[18] The quality of his dossiers renders his denial suspect. There was apparently some truth to Morès' story--but how much?

A factor entirely separate from the studied superficiality with which the Panama investigations were carried out which contributed to Clemenceau's exoneration was the impossibility of demonstrating the thesis that he had consciously participated in treasonous activities with Herz. The most vociferous of his detractors, xenophobes such as Déroulède and Millevoye, fitted all of the evidence of his subterranean connections with the financier into this conception of the situation, making it the essential case against Clemenceau. When an attempt to prove this monstrous interpretation failed, the original evidence against the Radical leader appeared to be correspondingly invalidated.

For three months after the pronouncement in the Chamber by de

Mahy that, as a consequence of the exposure of Clemenceau's connections with the "foreign agent" Cornélius Herz, his reign over the Chamber was ended, Clemenceau had respite from attack. However, his occupation of the tribune to speak during a discussion of universal suffrage on June 19 produced an unexpected result. Before he could even begin his oration, Déroulède cried out, "C'est l'ami de Cornélius Herz, l'ami de l'Angleterre qui va parler . . . Qu'il parle donc en anglais!" Millevoye, (who, incidentally, had close ties with the Marquis de Morès' anti-Semitic circles) chimed in with a demand that before Clemenceau be allowed to speak he be made to explain his connections with Herz. In spite of the president's imposition of fines upon them and an offer by Louis Barthou to personally bring up the matters of which they spoke at some more appropriate time in the future, Déroulède and Millevoye persisted in abusively heckling Clemenceau throughout his speech.[19]

At its conclusion, Déroulède requested to be allowed to explain what concern had prompted his audacious behaviour. He claimed that the compromising papers that Herz threatened to uncover in England had been obtained by the British government, with the terrible result that, "c'est le cabinet de Londres qui possède contre nous de véritables secrets de l'État." Clemenceau called him a liar and a phone patriot, whereupon Déroulède countered that the Radical leader was no longer in that category of men who had a right to deny anything. Why? Millevoye promised to explain all to the Chamber within three days.[20]

In fact, the explanation of his and Déroulède's extraordinary performances was given on June 21 in the old Boulangist newspaper *La Cocarde*, when it charged that an employee in the British embassy had

stolen a number of documents proving that Clemenceau had betrayed his country.[21] The papers were in the possession of Millevoye, who intended to read them in the Chamber the next day. It was with surprise that a *Figaro* reporter discovered perfect tranquility reigning at the offices of *La Justice* in spite of these allegations.[22]

On the following day the deputies, among whom the rumour had circulated that a new Panama was about to break, gathered to witness Clemenceau's political destruction. The galleries overflowed with spectators. Clemenceau, appearing much aged, seized the initiative in the confrontation. He said that he understood that a theft had been made of some documents, and that French justice knew how to deal with thieves. Millevoye then spoke, condemning Clemenceau for having advocated the abandonment of the department of Corsica[23] and countenanced the loss of Egypt to French influence. The Radical leader replied that that was not the question--the press had accused him of having betrayed his country for a price, and he defied Millevoye to produce the proof. Goaded by his opponent's cries of "Liar!" the accuser began to read, with unforeseen reluctance, the purported correspondence from the British embassy that he had in his dossier. The gibes from the Radical benches provoked by a multitude of factual errors in the material were answered by Millevoye with a profession of faith in its authenticity. The whole Chamber insisted that he read on, that an end be made of the matter. Thereupon Millevoye produced what he thought would prove the trump card: he declared that he had read the material to the Premier and the Foreign Minister the day before, and that they had considered the papers to be of profound significance--the former, Millevoye and Morès later revealed, had reacted by suggesting that Clemenceau be

given the opportunity to commit suicide before being exposed.[24] However, this prop was immediately pulled from under Millevoye when Develle, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, intervened, stating that, while he did not question Millevoye's good faith, it was evident that he had been the victim of an "abominable mystification." "Non! pas la victime," cried Clemenceau, "l'auteur!" At this development Déroulède exclaimed that he was through with politics and that he was resigning his seat in the Chamber--and walked out.

Millevoye read on. However, he could not get beyond listing the individuals who his papers declared were on the British payroll. His putting together Clemenceau, Burdeau, and Rochefort in this category was so ludicrous that it elicited from Maurice Barrès, his friend, a demand for his resignation, as well. Amidst the jeers of his fellow deputies, and before the uncontrolled hilarity of Clemenceau, Millevoye slipped from the Chamber.[25]

The documents had, in fact, been furnished by an employee of the British embassy, one Alfred Véron (alias Norton); but he had a long criminal record, which included two sentences for forgery.[26] He had approached Gaston Calmette, in March, with similar papers, but the *Figaro* reporter had recognized their patent falseness and shown him the door.[27] On August 7, 1893, Véron was sentenced to three years imprisonment for forging the documents that Millevoye had transported to the Chamber.

That Clemenceau's most vociferous antagonists--until then the self-appointed champions of the assault upon him arising from the Panama revelations--had been associated with the promulgation of the forgeries cast a long shadow back on the accusations of the previous

months. The turn of events had enormous propaganda potential for Clemenceau's defense, and he exploited it to the full. *La Justice* treated Déroulède and Millevoye (and Ernest Judet) as conscious participants in the fabrication of the spurious documents,[28] thereby attempting to cast doubt on the ingenuousness of the campaign that they had waged against him. Endeavouring to administer the *coup de grâce* to Clemenceau's career before the end of the parliamentary session had badly misfired: its overall effect was to exonerate the Radical leader. *Le Temps*, previously uncommitted as to the significance of the evidence against Clemenceau, pronounced him the most calumniated man in France.[29]

However, the only real reflection that the collapse of their argument had on Déroulède and Millevoye was to diminish the estimation of their personal judgment. They were--exceedingly willing--dupes. No one ever produced evidence of their having themselves actually concocted false evidence against Clemenceau. Millevoye, having tendered his resignation from the Chamber, said that if any such suspicion hung over him he rejected his parliamentary immunity and insisted on standing trial. That Déroulède genuinely believed his theory that Clemenceau was the instrument of a foreign power is hardly questionable; he had faced death on the duelling field for the privilege of propounding it.

In reality, the evidence against Clemenceau accumulated during the Panama investigations was unchanged. The testimony of Rochefort, Stéphan, and de Lesseps had never indicated that Clemenceau was a foreign agent. However, what had become in popular appreciation the most important--because most clamorously denounced--aspect of his

alleged guilt had been blasted. Clemenceau's rebuttal had behind it the authority of a legal judgment. If his juridical immunity was assured by the laxness of the Panama investigations, his reputation was largely rehabilitated by the foolish zeal of those most intently bent on its demolition.

CHAPTER SIX

BEFORE THE POPULAR TRIBUNAL

Elections to the Chamber of Deputies were held in August 1893. Of the more than five hundred seats being contested throughout France, the one to which the most attention was directed--as a consequence of the controversy of the preceding months--was that which Georges Clemenceau was endeavouring to retain in Draguignan. Isolated as it was in the department of Var in the extreme south-east of the country, the *arrondissement* was nearly as far-removed from Paris as was geographically possible, yet the newspapers in the capital devoted a disproportionate amount of their commentary to the campaign being waged there. *Le Figaro* went to the length of despatching a special reporter to the scene two weeks before the first casting of votes. The climax of the political drama that had been preparing for nearly a year was at hand.

In the fight for Clemenceau's political survival the latest rounds had considerably improved the Radical leader's position. A court of law had recognized that the supposedly conclusive proofs of his criminality (as his opponents perceived it)--the Norton papers--were baseless forgeries. The humiliation of Dérouléde and Millevoye, his chief detractors, was so complete that each abandoned his plans to run in the election. The question was whether the confident predictions of Clemenceau's electoral defeat voiced earlier by some commentators would be realized or the affair of the Norton documents had sufficiently absolved him of suspicion to ensure his re-election.

Clemenceau had been the choice of the electors of Draguignan--a district that, in spite of its essentially rural character, had been oriented towards the political Left for decades and even sustained a moderately active anarchist movement--in 1885 and 1889 previously, and even the embarrassment of having to denounce publicly his own political creation, General Boulanger, had not prevented him from increasing his support in the second of these elections.[1]

Nevertheless, Clemenceau was defeated in the contest in 1893--an indication that new factors had come into play. The work of Yves Malartic, who has done a detailed study of the election in Draguignan based on material in the departmental archives, suggests that these are capable of reasonably precise definition: one was the revelation of his connections (frequently exaggerated or distorted) with the Panama affair; a second, the organizational tactics adopted by the other candidates running against him; and a third, the deployment of forces alien to the district which were bent upon excising him from the political scene. It should be observed that the importance of the first of these factors was very much a function of the use made of it by the other two.

Of the first factor enough explanation has been given in previous chapters. Understandably, during the electioneering Clemenceau's connections with Cornélius Herz were advertized by the Radical leader's opponents in town and countryside. The accounts had not been purged of their contamination with the nonsense of Clemenceau's being an English agent. This was possibly a deliberate device to intensify the impact of the accusations, for Draguignan, a coastal district whose economy was in part dependent upon maritime commerce,

had a long tradition of Anglophobia.[2] The second factor is more curious. The question of the elimination of Clemenceau from politics, posed by a local newspaper in February 1893, was followed as early as April 2 by a number of citizens of the Var attempting to organize to oust the "homme néfaste" then sitting as their representative in the Chamber. At the instigation of three of Clemenceau's long-standing local political opponents, a *Ligue anti-clemenciste* was organized whose declared purpose was to re-establish the district's reputation for honest dealing by presenting to the *arrondissement* "un groupe d'hommes dévoués, partisans résolus des candidatures locales et disposés à concentrer leur action contre un homme qui a perdu la confiance de ses électeurs." League members, who had to be both professed Republicans and electors from the Var, promised that they would withdraw from the election in favour of whichever fellow member obtained the most votes in the first balloting.[3]

By August 8, six individuals besides Clemenceau had announced their candidature. Four were declared Radicals: an engineer named Engelfred; Antelme, a career army officer; Rouvier, owner and editor of the local newspaper *Le Petit Dracenois*; and Maurel, a former deputy and mayor of a local commune. As well, there was a socialist, Vincent, shoemaker and mayor of Flayosc, and Joseph Jourdan, who described himself merely as a republican, and who apparently, followed whatever political line was dictated by expediency. All of these men subscribed to the league.[4] Presenting as it did a large number of candidates of different political hues (from moderate republican to socialist), which would allow voters to tailor their ballots very much in accordance with individual preference, the league's potential appeal was

great. Of special interest in this regard was the candidature of Maurel. In 1885, when the *scrutin de liste* was in use, he had been elected on Clemenceau's list. However, institution of the *scrutin d'arrondissement* in 1889 had made it necessary for Clemenceau to choose a single constituency in which to run.[5] He opted for Draguignan, thereby displacing Maurel. The latter vented his bitterness with oratorical violence in 1893. Because of his previous association with Clemenceau's cause, the votes that Maurel was able to attract to himself had the most directly detrimental effect on his rival's campaign.[6]

That Clemenceau was in reality confronted with the problem of defeating a team rather than individual candidates was not the only unusual aspect of the election. Nor, probably, was it decisive in producing his defeat. The fact was that the efforts of the anti-Clemenciste league were bolstered by those of persons in Paris who had the same objective. The most effective of these was Ernest Judet, political editor of *Le Petit Journal*, whose owner, Marinoni, had placed the enormous resources of the newspaper at his disposal for the purpose of destroying Clemenceau politically.[7] Judet fulfilled his assignment with energy, for, besides holding Clemenceau's entire political past against him, he was smarting from the Radical leader's refusal (on, it would seem, unjustified grounds) to permit him to vindicate his honour on the duelling field after Clemenceau had accused him of actively participating in the fabrication of the Norton papers.[8]

Clemenceau's campaign began with much promise. He had two great strengths: an organized and enthusiastic group of local supporters and a gift of speech that few in the Chamber of Deputies and certainly none of his opponents in the election of 1893 could approach.

Indeed, the potential of his oratorical powers had been demonstrated in the district only a year before, when widespread criticism of his advocacy of governmental suppression of Victorien Sardou's play *Thermidor* (on the ground that it denied the value of a period of the Great Revolution, which Clemenceau insisted must be regarded as a "bloc") had spurred him to deliver a justificatory address to his electors in the Var. His listeners, most of whom had probably never even heard of Sardou before, emerged from the meeting calling for the playwright's death. Sardou himself declared, "Si j'étais allé dans le Var . . . je n'en serais pas revenu vivant."[9] Clemenceau was apparently able to work similar magic in the first speech that he made in his campaign in 1893. On August 8, he addressed a crowd of 1,500 persons in the courtyard of a café in Salernes, previously one of the centres of his political support. Not only did his words elicit tears from some in the audience, but it also apparently instilled in a large number the conviction that Clemenceau had been unjustly accused by his detractors, for in the subsequent election the polls at Salernes yielded Clemenceau more than twice as many votes as his opponents in combination.[10]

As this "Salernes speech," so-called, has frequently been adjudged by historians as the greatest that the Radical leader ever delivered ("greatest" according to what criteria is never stated),[11] and as it has also been used as the final word in clearing Clemenceau of the charges that had been made against him,[12] it warrants critical examination. Essentially, the speech was a rebuttal of the allegations that had been made of his improper involvement in the corruption associated with the Panama affair. The attention that he devoted to these issues affords an indication of the influence that Clemenceau

suspected that the controversy that had raged in recent months about his relations with Herz could have had on the electors. To controvert the story that he had received large sums of money from the financier, he pictured himself in a penurious condition, unable even to give his daughter a dowry when she married. "Où sont les millions?" he asked sarcastically. Admittedly Herz had been a sleeping partner in *La Justice*, but at a time when he had been an eminently reputable personage, acclaimed for his scientific achievements by even Déroulède's newspaper, *Le Drapeau*. He concluded with a ringing indictment of the Panama criminals--not the politicians who were alleged to have received bribes, but the Company officials who had swindled thousands of French investors--and a brief review of the Radical platform.[13]

There were numerous shortcomings in Clemenceau's arguments. The story of his poverty was evidently an invention. As conclusive proof of having dissociated his financial affairs from those of Herz he read the note whose inconclusiveness Barboux had demonstrated at the corruption trial in the previous March. "Cette note n'a pas été publiée apparemment en vue de la campagne qui devait se faire huit ans plus tard," he added, neglecting to mention that rumour about his connections with Herz had prompted the initial publication of the article. Understandably, he had several laudatory remarks for Vallé's *Rapport Général*, which had treated his case so cursorily; however, he lied outright in saying that his name was absent from the pages of the document, for Vallé had involved him in his discussion of the testimony of the bank clerk, Stéphan. Clemenceau's speech contained other oddities, such as the placement in immediate proximity of a condemnation of persons who use *ad hominem* arguments with a searing personal attack upon Paul

Déroulède. Clemenceau's words had much literary merit, and undoubtedly he expressed them with wondrous persuasion; but, on analysis, their content cannot be described as convincing. The plaudits that historians have given this speech seem unjustified.

Nevertheless, it was received favorably by the audience, who gave Clemenceau an overwhelming vote of confidence. His opposition were made vividly aware of the power of his tongue, and determined that it should be silenced. Thereafter, wherever he delivered a public speech, his voice was drowned out by hecklers crying: "Oh, yes! Panama! Cornélius Herz! A bas l'Anglais!"[14] The measure of the success of such tactics is the fact that Clemenceau was reduced to holding closed meetings, and , when these too were disrupted, surprise meetings. The ultimate result, of course, was a considerable dwindling in the size of his audiences.

An eyewitness account of Clemenceau's last attempt to address a public gathering has been left by the *Figaro* reporter, Jules Huret. According to him five hundred people were waiting to hear the Radical leader at Draguignan on August 19, the day before the first balloting. Clemenceau entered the hall surrounded by friends and, after the customary preliminaries, rose to deliver his talk:

> Il dit: "Citoyens!" Une bordée de sifflets parti des quatre coins de la salle l'interrompt aussitôt; des applaudissements énergiques répondent à plusieurs reprises. M. Clemenceau a encore des amis, c'est clair, mais peut-être sont-ils tous là?
>
> Le silence se fait et le candidat reprend: "Citoyens!" On siffle de nouveau. On fait: "Hou! hou! oh! yes!"[15]

Clemenceau sat down while the mayor of Draguignan, a friend, requested the audience to be silent, a procedure repeated four times before the

police commissioner in attendance declared the meeting dissolved. Then, "M. Clemenceau attend une accalmie d'une seconde et crie de toutes ses forces: "Vous êtes des lâches!"

La Justice attributed the responsibility for organizing these obstructionist tactics to the Marquis de Morès, and friends, who was said to have recruited a band of Piedmontese ruffians in Marseilles and instructed them to pursue Clemenceau as he campaigned through the district.[16] Malartic accepts this view without enlarging on it or giving any source for his information.[17] However, there are reasons for questioning the accuracy of the story. How mercenary were the demonstrations against Clemenceau is a difficult matter to resolve. That there were some local participants is proven by their identification by name in the newspaper reports of various incidents. Morès himself was in Paris until August 12,[18] a date subsequent to the first occasions upon which Clemenceau was prevented from speaking by the outcry at his meetings. It is certain that the Marquis had intended to campaign against Clemenceau, and that he travelled to the Var for that purpose;[19] but, according to a report in *Le Figaro*, after being intercepted by a delegation from the *Ligue anti-clemenciste*, who advised him that his participation in the electioneering would do Clemenceau more good than harm, he contented himself with awaiting the results of the first balloting before joining the fray.[20]

Although prevented from speaking, Clemenceau was not entirely bereft of means of propaganda. He covered the walls of the buildings in the district with posters entitled "Moi, je les accuse!" in which he detailed the sins of his opponents. The lawyer Joseph Jourdan, who had become the major threat to his seat, received special attention. Clemenceau alluded to a financial scandal in Marseilles with which his name had been associated.[21] Jourdan replied in a poster campaign of his own: "Les électeurs crient Panama, [Clemenceau] les renvoie à Marseille!"[22]

However, the most virulent exchanges occurred in the fierce press war that was engaged. Yves Malartic even speculates on whether the "style parfois ordurier" of attacks on his opponents by Clemenceau's local newspaper *La Justice du Var* could have done the Radical leader's cause less good than harm.[21] *La Justice* itself took on a new character, many articles distinguishing themselves for their crude passion. That Ernest Judet was the object of most of this abuse is probably an index of the troublesomeness of the campaign that he was leading against Clemenceau and his friends. On the front page of nearly every edition of *La Justice* there was an attack upon "Judet la crapule," "Juquet dit Judet," "Judet l'agent des jésuites," or "Judet le crétin." "Il ment en écrivant, en parlant, en dormant, en respirant," declared *La Justice*. "Sa fonction est de mentir du matin au soir, du soir au matin. Mens donc, drôle, puisque tu es condamné à mentir jusqu'à la mort." When Judet made comments favourable towards the candidature of the Rightist Maurice Barrès, he was categorized as a Boulangist returning "à son vomissement;" when his attacks on Clemenceau's friend Maujan appeared to be benefiting his socialist political competitor, Judet was accused of furthering revolutionary socialism; when he used an article by the *Times'* Paris correspondent de Blowitz, he was condemned for employing as a source a "juif allemand."[22]

This purulent barrage was mounted in response to the vicious assault that Judet had launched on Clemenceau's character. Although he conceded that the Norton papers were forgeries, Judet deliberately perpetuated the discredited view that Clemenceau was an English agent, and editorially *Le Petit Journal* treated him as a national danger rather than as political opponent. One of the special propaganda sheets of

which Judet had hundreds of thousands of copies printed for free distribution--not only in Draguignan, but throughout France--caricatured a nattily dressed Clemenceau in top hat and dancing slippers juggling four sacks marked "livres sterling" on a stage with a number of ballerinas. In the prompter's box was drawn an English soldier.[23] However, the case against Clemenceau was elaborated beyond this.

On the day preceding the first round of the election Judet published a comprehensive list of Clemenceau's supposed misdeeds. His denials of his affluence were ridiculed. The list of his alleged crimes was extensive. He had attempted to deprive France of Corsica, and had succeeded in depriving her of Egypt. He had profited from a blackmail operation and had trafficked in decorations for suppliers of funds for *La Justice*. Judet even claimed that the Norton incident was a maneuvre on Clemenceau's part to distract attention from the proofs of his real crimes, which had been uncovered during the Panama investigations. An old charge that Clemenceau had allowed two generals to be killed by a mob during the turbulent events of 1871 was dredged up.[24]

There was much other comment about the Draguignan election in the newspapers of Paris. The Radical organs spoke in Clemenceau's defense: *La Nation* argued that all of the purported evidence produced against Clemenceau had evaporated when subjected to critical examination; *La Lanterne* registered alarm that the division in the republican ranks over the issue of Clemenceau's worthiness to remain a deputy was playing into the hands of the enemies of the Republic and amazement at the spectacle of all of the "enfants-perdus" in France descending on an obscure rural district to combat a single man.[25] Organs of moderate

Republicanism, such as *Le Jour, Le Siècle,* and *L'Estafette*, expressed the opinion that the interests of politics in the country would best be served by a complete purging of Clemenceau's influence.[26]

What, in general, the inhabitants of Draguignan themselves made of the extraordinary controversy in whose midst they found themselves we can at best conjecture. Jules Huret took a cursory poll of opinion in the district and reported that the words of an old man typified the attitude of those to whom he talked: "Bien sûr qu'il a mal agi, M. Clemenceau; on le sait bien, mais malgré ça, il est toujours regardé plus haut que les autres."[27]

The electors expressed themselves on August 20, in an incongruously tranquil balloting. Clemenceau received 6,634 votes (which was comparable to his tally in the elections four years previously); his runner-up, Jourdan, 4,686. The socialist candidate Vincent placed third with 1,702 and the other candidates shared approximately 2,000 other votes. In *La Justice* the article announcing the results was headed, in giant type, "Victoire de Clemenceau--Écrasement des Faussaires." The elation was premature. An absolute majority of the number of votes was necessary for victory in the first balloting, and Clemenceau had failed to obtain it. Viewed from different perspectives, the outcome could be interpreted in two contradictory ways. Considering the election as a contest between individuals, Clemenceau's popularity had outstripped that of any of his opponents; but, as a collectivity, the adherents of the League had attracted the preponderance of the votes.

As the result of the first casting of votes had been inconclusive, a second was to be held on September 3. Clemenceau's

supporters spoke in terms of certain success for their candidate, for they anticipated that Vincent, a professed socialist, would merely withdraw from the contest without committing his voters to any one else's cause. Surely his radical convictions would prevent him from endorsing Jourdan, a man who, besides having become the darling of the forces of reaction, was attempting "l'incroyable entreprise de se faire élire député sans programme."[30] *La Justice* paid Vincent several compliments, one consisting of congratulatory comments on his having refrained from actively promoting the activities of the League.[31] However, Clemenceau's backers were abruptly disillusioned. Not only did Vincent, like all of the other candidates, honour the commitment that he had undertaken in joining the League and throw his unqualified support behind Jourdan, but he agreed to accept the presidency of the organization during the second phase of the electoral campaign.[32] His actions provoked some critical comment from his ideological brethren. Jean Jaurès wrote in *La Petite République:*

> J'ai lu, avec quelque surprise dans la proclamation recente de M. Vincent, maire de Flayosc, que "l'honneur des socialistes" leur commandait de voter, dans le Var, pour le concurrent direct de M. Clemenceau. Il se peut que M. Vincent ait contracté des engagements avec la ligue anticlemenciste et qu'il se considère comme tenu d'honneur à n'y point manquer, mais c'est son affaire, ce n'est pas l'affaire de notre parti. . . .
>
> . . . L'honneur de parti ne consiste pas précisément à entrer comme subalterne dans un syndicat électoral présidé par la réaction.[33]

If the socialists of the district did not deem Clemenceau's explanations adequate, he continued, they had no alternative but to maintain Vincent's candidature in the second phase of the election.

However, Clemenceau and Jourdan were the only contestants for the seat in the second round of balloting. The campaign after August

20 is perhaps best described as a denouement in the drama. For some reasons, either because previous experience had proven it futile or because he had already, as he shortly afterward expressed it, become disgusted with politics, Clemenceau did not even attempt any public speeches. He did issue several posters whose basic import was the Jourdan was as reactionary and anti-Republican as the priests who gave him their open support. To these charges Jourdan replied by publishing the attestations of his honesty and republicanism of two of his old socialist political rivals, the mayor of Marseilles and his adjunct. The testimonial of the latter concluded: "Dans tous les cas, il n'est pas permis d'hésiter entre cet honnête homme et M. Clemenceau."[32] In his turn, Clemenceau received a letter from the strike committee of the miners of Carmaux (to whose strike in 1892 he and *La Justice* had given much support) expressing their appreciation of his past efforts on their behalf and their hope that he would retain his seat.[33]

The unflagging activity of his campaign organization was unable to save him. On September 3, with 9,503 votes cast in his favour, nine hundred more than Clemenceau, Jourdan became the people's chosen representative. He entered the Chamber of Deputies with his reputation already made: he was the "tombeur de Clemenceau," the feller of the feller of ministries.[34]

The British Marxist and acquaintance of Clemenceau, Henry M. Hyndman, claimed that, while he personally regretted the fact, "the Socialist vote turned [Clemenceau] out."[35] This is by no means certain. Clemenceau had received 2,000 more votes in the second balloting than in the first, meaning that he had only lost 800 from his total in the election four years previously. There was a particularly heavy turnout

in the second round in 1893, indicating, perhaps, that the League had achieved its stated aim of convincing normally apathetic electors that they had a patriotic duty to fulfil in ousting the Radical leader.

After writing a letter to the electors of the Var in which he admonished them to remember always the "campagne infâme" that had been waged against him,[36] Clemenceau boarded the train for Paris. He had to be protected on route to the station from a mob shouting: "A bas Clemenceau, à bas l'ami de Cornélius!"[37]

Although their rank-and-file success experienced only a slight decline, the election had serious effects on the Radical party. It was practically decapitated. Besides Clemenceau, Maujan and Pichon, who had distinguished themselves by their loyalty to their leader through his tribulations and who had paid for their fidelity by being included among the targets of Erenest Judet's attacks in *Le Petit Journal*, were defeated. As well, Floquet, President of the Chamber when the Panama scandal first exploded, had been under fire from the press and during his electoral meetings for his alleged misdeeds in connection with the recent affair and lost his seat. However, the general effect of the Panama scandal on the outcome of the elections was not very significant. The *chéquards* Rouvier and Emmanuel Arène were returned on the first ballot (although it was many years before the former was entrusted with another cabinet post); Jules Roche on the second. Delahaye, the individual whose accusations had been largely responsible for the parliamentary investigation of the scandal, suffered defeat, along with many of his comrades on the Right.

The fundamental issue on which the election had been fought was Clemenceau's suitability to occupy a governmental position. However,

the matters that rendered his suitability liable to doubt were never clarified. Charges were hurled at him indiscriminately. Both he and his opponents proved content to wage a war of propaganda, in which the Radical leader's more limited means put him at a disadvantage. In view of the ferocity of the campaign against him, perhaps the real surprise of the election was that he managed to achieve the measure of success that he did.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

Urbain Gohier, a parliamentary reporter during the Panama debates of 1893, recollected many years afterward that the most impressive aspect of the whole affair was the performance of Clemenceau under the tremendous strain that he endured. Obviously guilty (so said Gohier), he remained unbroken and defiant while his opponents circled him like a pack of wolves.[1] However, Clemenceau's defeat in the election in September was a severe trial of the seemingly indomitable combative spirit that was so marked a trait of his character. The bottom had suddenly dropped out of a prestigious career; his political fortunes were lower than at any other time in his life. Not content to be simply eased out of the political scene, he had fought a battle which had resulted in his name being defiled in every district of the country. He avoided his friends, seeking solitude. According to George Suarez, he considered suicide.[2]

In reality, his situation was, perhaps, less desperate than it appeared, for in the very election in which he had suffered defeat a precedent for the rehabilitation of disgraced politicians was set by the returning to the Chamber of Deputies Daniel Wilson, who had been similarly run out of public office in a scandal only six years previously. Nevertheless, Clemenceau never contested a popular election again. His enemies kept the memory of his association with Cornélius Herz. Occasionally they reminded him. Reopening of the issue was in part the occasion of duels that Clemenceau fought with Paul Deschanel

in 1894 and Édouard Drumont four years later.

There is some irony, perhaps, in the fact of Clemenceau's extensively regaining his public reputation for his defense of Captain Dreyfus against some of the same charges that had contributed to his own political disgrace during the Panama scandal. Like Clemenceau, Dreyfus was unjustly accused of being a foreign agent. However, what is even more ironical is the readiness with which Clemenceau first denounced Dreyfus as a spy, in spite of his own appreciation of the irresponsibility with which that charge was frequently laid.

Even when Clemenceau re-entered political life as a senator four years after the death of Herz, the Panama business was not forgotten. In 1906, the year in which Clemenceau obtained his first portfolio in a cabinet, a booklet was published consisting of passages from Maurice Barrès' historical novel, *Leurs Figures*, that described some of the evidence implicating Clemenceau in the Panama affair.[3] Indeed, in some circles, the controversy of 1893 still affected his reputation after his becoming renowned as the 'saviour of France' during the Great War. The cry, "C'est l'homme de Cornélius Herz!" was raised in the course of a discussion among senators and journalists in 1920, when Clemenceau was being considered for election to the presidency of the Republic.[4] Although the passage of time greatly diminished their effectiveness, the reproaches originally leveled at Clemenceau during the Panama scandal were sporadically revived throughout the rest of his career.

NOTES

CHAPTER ONE

[1] *Le véritable Clémenceau* (Berne, 1920), *passim.*

[2] *Clemenceau* (Paris, 1968), 175.

[3] *L'Évolution de la 3ᵉ République (1875-1914)* (Paris, 1921), 167.

[4] *Histoire de la Troisième République*, II (Paris, 1954), 322.

[5] *The Development of Modern France (1870-1939)* (London, 1953), 285.

[6] *The Third Republic of France. The First Phase, 1871-1894* (London, 1962), 323.

[7] *Clemenceau* (Paris, 1931), 54-56, 62-65.

[8] *Clemenceau* (Hamden, Conn.; 1962), 47-49.

[9] *Les deux scandales de Panama* (Paris, 1964), 183.

CHAPTER TWO

[1] No comprehensive scholarly study of the Panama scandal has yet been undertaken. A more detailed summary than the following is available in Chapman, Chapter Nineteen. Complete books on the subject which are recommended are Adrien Dansette's *Les affaires de Panama* (Paris, 1934) and Bruno Weil's *Panama* (Paris, 1934). Bouvier's book is essentially a selection of documents relevant to the affair.

[2] *Chambre des Députés. Rapport général fait au nom de la Commision d'enquête sur les affaires de Panama*, I (Paris, 1898), 135. Hereinafter cited as *RG* (1898). Some references give the figure as 12,000,000 francs.

[3] André Siegfried, *Suez and Panama* (London, 1940), 307.

[4] "Dr. Herz's American Career--He Left Many to Mourn Their Relations With Him," December 23, 1892, 5.

[5] *RG* (1898), I, 308.

[6] Henri Rochefort, *Les Aventures de ma vie*, V (Paris, 1896), 265.

[7] *RG* (1898), I, 125.

[8] *Ibid.*, I, 131.

[9] *Chambre des Députés. Rapport fait au nom de la Commission d'enquête chargée de faire la lumière sur les allégations portées à la tribune à l'occasion des affaires de Panama*, II (Paris, 1893), 131. Hereinafter cited as *R* (1893).

[10] See the extensive excerpts from the *Libre Parole* articles in Bouvier, 142-147.

[11] Chastenet, II, 313; Alexandre Zévaès, *Le scandale du Panama* (Paris, 1931), 90.

[12] *Chambre des Députés. Journal Officiel. Débats Parlementaires* November 22, 1892, 1647-1657. Hereinafter cited as *JOC*.

[13] Friedrich Engels and Paul and Laura Lafargue, *Correspondence*, III (Moscow, 1959), 221.

[14] *Ibid.*, III, 226.

[15] Edmond and Jules de Goncourt, *Journal: Mémoires de la vie littéraire*, IV (Paris, 1956), 338, 358.

[16] The information contained on the cheque stubs is set out in tabular form in Bouvier, 156.

[17] The text of the note is available in the *Rapport Général par M. Vallé* (Paris, 1897), 102. Hereinafter cited as *RG* (1893).

[18] *RG* (1898), I, 30.

[19] Baihaut's *Impressions cellulaires* (Paris, 1898) is a compilation of his letters to his wife, to whom he wrote daily. They indicate that he believed that other deputies and the Company administrators had participated in crimes as serious as his own and should have been sojourning with him in the prison of Étampes.

[20] *RG* (1898), I, 355 ff.

[21] *R* (1893), II, 572.

[22] Maurice Barrès, "The Panama Scandal," *Cosmopolitan*, XVII (June 1894), 204-210.

[23] *JOC*, February 8, 1893, 486.

CHAPTER THREE

[1]*R* (1893), II, 345.

[2]Text of letter available in *RG* (1898), II, 238n.

[3]*R* (1893), II, 345.

[4]Jean Martet, *Le silence de M. Clemenceau* (Paris, 1929), 212. Martet's book is a collection of conversations that he, Clemenceau's private secretary, had with his employer during his last years.

[5]See text of note published in December 1886 in *La Justice* on pages 21-22, below.

[6]Georges Suarez, *La Vie orgueilleuse de Clemenceau* (Paris, 1930), 154.

[7]Martet, 212-213; "The Cholera," *The Times*, July 9, 1884, 5.

[8]Édouard Drumont, *La Fin d'un monde* (Paris, 1892), 285n; Weil, 57.

[9]Judet, 170.

[10]Bruun, 44.

[11]Brogan, 184; Bruno Weil, *Grandeur et décadence du Général Boulanger* (Paris, 1931), 89.

[12]Ch. de Mazade, "Revue chronique," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, LXXII, (January 15, 1886), 469; X . . . du *Figaro*, *Les Coulisses du Boulangisme* (Paris, 1890), 4.

[13]Brogan, *loc. cit.*; Adrien Dansette, *Le Boulangisme* (Paris, 1946), 30; John Roberts, "General Boulanger," *History Today*, V, No. 10 (1955), 659; Alexandre Zévaès, *Au temps du Boulangisme* (Paris, 1930), 28.

[14]Arthur Meyer, *Ce que mes yeux ont vu* (Paris, 1911), 76.

[15]*JOC*, December 21, 1892, 1889-1891.

[16]See Herz's correspondence published in "Une Interview de M. Cornélius Herz," *Le Figaro*, January 20, 1893, 1.

[17]*Ibid.*; Weil, *loc. cit.*

[18]Weil, *Panama*, 55-56.

[19]Louis Andrieux, *A travers la République* (Paris, 1926), 350-352. I know of no supporting evidence of this incident.

[20]*R* (1893), II, 603-604.

[21]Bruun, *loc. cit.*

[22]*RG* (1898), I, 306.

[23]*Ibid.*, II, 161.

[24]*Ibid.*, I, 146n.

[25]*Ibid.*, II, 158-159.

[26]*Ibid.*, 162.

[27]Drumont, 284n.

[28]Goncourt brothers, III, 598.

[29]Cited in Suarez, 168.

[30]Sometime after this date but before the beginning of 1888 the strained relations that had developed between Clemenceau and Boulanger took on the character of a political split. The precise date of this occurrence has been a matter of dispute.

[31]Drumont, 283-284.

[32]"M. Cornélius Herz," *Le Figaro*, December 12, 1892, 1.

[33]"La Chambre," December 14, 1892, 1.

[34]December 15, 1892, 1.

[35]*JOC*, December 14, 1892, 1811.

[36]"Réponse," *La Justice*, December 13, 1892, 1.

[37]*JOC*, *loc. cit.*

[38]Deposition of Andrieux. *RG* (1893), II, 405.

[39]*Ibid.*, 340.

[40]*JOC*, December 14, 1892,

[41]*RG* (1893), *loc. cit.*

[42]*R* (1893), II, 342.

[43]*La Justice*, *loc. cit.*

[44] *Ibid.*

[45] *Ibid.*

[46] *R* (1893), II, 343.

[47] Barrès, 206.

[48] *RG* (1893), 102.

[49] *R* (1893), *loc. cit.*

[50] *Ibid.*, 522.

[51] *RG* (1898), I, 129.

[52] *Ibid.*, 322. The men who expressed these opinions were Paul Samary, a conservative deputy, and Ernest Vallé, moderate Republican. Strangely, Vallé had not even commented on the matter in his 1893 report.

[53] *RG* (1893), 102.

[54] Quesnay de Beaurepaire, *Le Panama et la République* (Paris, 1899), 99; Bouvier, 148. These two authors disagree on the date on which Constans received the list. The former says that he was told by ex-Premier Loubet that Constans obtained it before March 1890; the latter states that he was given it during January 1891.

[55] *R* (1893), II, 344.

[56] "Affaire du Panama," *Le Temps*, March 2, 1893, 2.

[57] Letter from Herz to the Commission of Inquiry. *RG* (1898), I, 321.

[58] "Une conversation de Cornélius Herz," *Le Figaro*, January 31, 1894, 1.

[59] "Une conversation de Cornélius Herz," *Le Temps*, February 1, 1894, 2.

[60] "M. Clémenceau chez Cornélius Herz à Londres," *Le Figaro*, December 24, 1892, 1.

[61] *La Justice*, December 25, 1892, 1.

[62] *JOC*, December 21, 1892, 1887-1888.

[63] *Clemenceau and the Third Republic* (London, 1959), 82.

[64] *Clemenceau: The Man and his Time* (New York, 1919), 124.

[65] André Siegfried, *Mes Souvenirs de la III^{e} République. Mon Père et son temps. Jules Siegfried, 1836-1922* (Paris, 1946), 109.

[66]Berthe Z. Szeps, *Clemenceau tel que je l'ai connu* (Algiers, 1944), 29. A description of the interior of Clemenceau's earlier home in Paris can be found in a letter from Paul Cambon to his wife dated December 1885. The house contained paintings of value and a piano. Paul Cambon, *Correspondence, 1870-1924*, I (Paris, 1940-1946), 272.

[67]Alexandre Zévaès, *Clemenceau* (Paris, 1949), 124.

[68]Georges Gatineau-Clemenceau, *Les pattes du Tigre aux griffes du destin* (Paris, 1961), 27.

[69]*Ibid.*; Jean Ajalbert, *Memoires du vrac. Au temps du symbolisme* (Paris, 1938), 84.

[70]*RG* (1898), I, 125.

[71]Judet, 210. Although Judet was Clemenceau's avowed enemy, there is no doubt about the authenticity of the letter from Cluseret in which this figure is suggested, for Judet published it without protest from the socialist deputy during the election campaign of 1893.

[72]"Le mariage de Clemenceau," *Mercure de France*, CCCXXIV, No. 1104 (1955), 647-648.

[73]Erlanger, 131; Monnerville, 112.

[74]"Discours de M. Clemenceau," *La Justice*, August 10, 1893, 1.

[75]Emile Mermet, II (Paris, 1881), 239.

[76]*R* (1893), II, 344.

[77]Drumont, *loc. cit.*; Judet, 194; *JOC*, December 21, 1892, 1888.

[78]*JOC*, July 25, 1894, 1592.

[79]Judet, 193-194.

[80]*R* (1893), II, 344.

[81]*JOC*, *loc. cit.*

[82]"Le Christ Bavarois," *L'Intransigeant*, February 2, 1893. Cited in *Le Temps*, February 5, 1893, 2.

[83]*RG* (1898), III, 216.

[84]*Le Temps*, *loc. cit.*

[85]*La Justice*, February 2, 1893, 1; "La Série," *ibid.*, February 5, 1893, 1. This last statement was, perhaps, an exaggeration. In 1891, a newspaper like *Le Figaro*, whose length, quality, and format were comparable to those of *La Justice*, expended nearly 4,000,000 francs. Of this sum,

something over one-half (the costs of paper, postage, folding, and distributing) could be considered as proportional to its circulation of 80,000. The significance of the magnitude of the remainder of the expenses becomes apparent when one realizes that the annual income of *La Justice* from subscriptions (if Judet's and Drumont's circulation figures are correct) was a mere 100,000 francs. Taking Déroulède's and Rochefort's figures, Herz's contributions would have averaged about 500,000 francs per year from 1885 to 1892. In fact, *La Justice* could probably have utilized such sums and still have presented the penurious appearance that it did with its ill-furnished offices and irregularly paid contributors. A month after his defeat in the elections of September 1893 Clemenceau took over the editorship of *La Justice* and the price of newspaper was halved to five centimes for an issue, evidently in an attempt to increase its readership. See Raymond Manevy, *La Presse de la III^e République* (Paris, 1955), 12, for the figures on *Le Figaro*; see the Goncourt *Journal*, III, 180, 770, for references to the material situation of *La Justice*.

86 *JOC*, February 7, 1893, 447.

87 "Chambre des Députés," *Le Temps*, February 8, 1893, 2.

88 *JOC*, *loc. cit.*

89 Meyer, 87.

90 Urbain Gohier, *L'Armée contre la Nation* (Paris, 1899), 329.

91 Roger L. Williams, *Henri Rochefort: Prince of the Gutter Press* (New York, 1966), 176, 267.

92 *RG* (1898), I, 323; III, 211-218.

93 Judet, 211.

94 Yves Malartic, "Comment Clemenceau fut battu aux élections législatives à Draguignan en 1893," *Provence Historique* (Marseilles), XII, No. 47 (1962), 116.

95 According to a document in Reinach's handwriting found among his papers and marked "Chantage Herz," the figure was 9,482,175 francs. The liquidator of Reinach's estate put it at 9,840,000 francs. *RG* (1898), II, 351; III, 38. Bouvier, 135, gives a figure of 12,000,000 francs.

96 *JOC*, December 21, 1892, 1888; *RG* (1898), III, 213.

97 "Réponse à M. Clemenceau," *Le Figaro*, August 7, 1893, 1; *La Libre Parole*, August 8, 1893 (article cited in *Le Temps*, 3, next day).

98 "Interview d'Henri Rochefort à propos de MM. Cornélius Herz et Clemenceau, *Le Figaro*, February 8, 1893, 2.

[99]Cited in *RG* (1898), II, 162n.

[100]"Dépositions de MM. Clemenceau, Floquet, et Freycinet," *La Justice*, March 11, 1893, 2.

[101]*R* (1893), II, 616.

[102]*Ibid.*, 341. Clemenceau had lived there for about nine years.

[103]*Ibid.*, 613-616.

[104]*JOC*, December 21, 1892, 1890.

[105]*R* (1893), II, 344.

[106]*JOC*, July 19, 1882, 1317 ff.

[107]Chastenet, II, 119.

[108]*JOC*, July 30, 1882, 1505-1509.

[109]"France--Resignation of the Ministry," July 31, 1882, 5-6.

[110]Charles de Freycinet, *Souvenirs, 1878-1893* (Paris, 1913), 238.

[111]Chastenet, II, 117.

[112]Chapman, 235.

[113]*RG* (1898), II, 29-35.

[114]*JOC*, July 11, 1892, 1195. Michon, 52, comments on the inconsistency of Clemenceau's attitude toward colonial expeditions without endeavouring to explain it.

[115]*RG* (1898), II, 235.

[116]*Ibid.*, I, 299; II, 236.

[117]Statement by Charles de Lesseps. *Ibid.*

[118]*Ibid.*, I, 316.

[119]Statement by Charles de Lesseps. *Ibid.*, 253.

[120]The following information is taken from the depositions made by de Lesseps, Floquet, Freycinet, and Clemenceau *in camera* before Judge Franqueville on January 8 and 9, 1893 (for text see, "Affaire de Panama," *Le Temps*, March 2, 1893, 2) and in public at de Lesseps' trial for corruption two months later (see, "Le Procès en Corruption," *ibid.*, March 12, 1893, 2-3).

[121]"Le Panama," January 10, 1893, 1.

[122] *JOC*, March 3, 1893, 815.

[123] Charles de Mazade, "Revue Chronique," March 15, 1893, 469.

[124] When Clemenceau used this argument, saying that the threat was aggravated by the fact that the country was on the eve of the elections, Barboux pointed out that the elections were, in fact, more than a year away. Clemenceau replied that it should not be necessary to inform Barboux that preparations for such elections take time.

[125] Frederick H. Seager, *The Boulanger Affair: Political Crossroad of France, 1886-1889* (New York, 1969), 134-135, 148, 159.

[126] *RG* (1898), I, 316.

[127] Bouvier, 134-135.

[128] *JOC*, March 23, 1893, 1058.

[129] "Cornélius Herz," *Le Temps*, June 28, 1893, 2.

[130] "Une interview de M. Cornélius Herz," *Le Figaro*, January 20, 1893, 1.

[131] "Une conversation de Cornélius Herz," *Le Figaro*, January 31, 1894, 1.

[132] *RG* (1898), I, 301.

[133] Weil, *Panama*, 487.

[134] Joseph Caillaux, *Mes Mémoires*, I (Paris, 1942-1947), 294n.

[135] *R* (1893), II, 395.

[136] *Ibid.*, 483-484.

[137] *Ibid.*, 487, 494.

[138] *Ibid.*, 484.

[139] *Ibid.*, 493.

[140] *Ibid.*, 531.

[141] January 20, 1893, 1.

[142] *R* (1893), II, 528-529.

[143] *Ibid.*, 546-547.

[144] *Ibid.*, 550-551.

[145] *Ibid.*, 509.

[146] *Ibid.*, 235.

[147] "Le Procès en Corruption," *Le Temps*, March 12, 1893, 3.

[148] *R* (1893), II, 508-509.

[149] "Une conversation de Cornélius Herz," *Le Figaro*, January 31, 1894, 1. Emphasis added.

[150] "Une interview de M. Cornélius Herz," *Le Figaro*, January 20, 1893, 1.

[151] Andrieux, 15. When, in 1927, at the age of eighty-six, Andrieux took the notion to obtain his doctorate (he succeeded in his endeavour!), Clemenceau attended his oral defense of his thesis and congratulated him on its acceptance. "M. Louis Andrieux docteur ès lettres," *Le Temps*, March 14, 1927, 2.

[152] Andrieux, 151-152.

[153] Philippe Erlanger, *Clemenceau* (Paris, 1968), 156; Suarez, 135.

[154] "Une conversation de Cornélius Herz," *Le Temps*, February 1, 1894, 2.

[155] *R* (1893), II, 518.

[156] *Ibid.*, 530.

[157] *Ibid.*, 597.

[158] Gabriel Hanotaux, "Carnets: 1893-1895," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, April 1, 1949, 387.

[159] Interview of Ribot reported by *Écho de Paris*. Cited in "Revue des Journaux," *Le Figaro*, August 11, 1893, 2.

[160] *JOC*, March 24, 1893, 1058.

[161] Martet, 212.

[162] *JOC*, December 21, 1892, 1890.

CHAPTER FOUR

[1] Douglas Johnson, *France and the Dreyfus Affair* (New York, 1967), 50-51.

[2] *JOC*, March 24, 1893, 1057.

[3]Weil, *Panama*, 57.

[4]*RG* (1898),

[5]Goncourt brothers, IV, 341.

[6]*JOC*, December 21, 1892, 1887-1890.

[7]Jean and Jérome Tharaud, *La Vie et la Mort de Déroulède* (Paris, 1925), 84.

[8]"Honour Saved, No Blood Lost--Déroulède and Clemenceau Fire Several Harmless Shots," *The New York Times*, December 23, 1892, 5. He distributed locks of his hair among his friends before confronting Clemenceau's pistol.

[9]*L'Entre Deux Guerres* (Paris, 1915), 263.

[10]Leon Daudet, *La vie orageuse de Clemenceau* (Rio de Janeiro, 1943), 73.

[11]Goncourt brothers, IV, 349.

[12]*JOC*, February 17, 1893, 583-584, 590-592.

[13]"La Chambre," February 17, 1893, 1.

[14]*JOC*, July 25, 1894, 1592.

[15]Article republished under title "Épilepsie," *La Justice*, March 24, 1893, 1-2.

[16]In 1906 the thesis was dignified with endorsement by a former French Foreign Minister, Émile Flourens in a book entitled *La France Conquise. Édouard VII et Clemenceau* (Paris, 1906), 107-111. Hinted at in Caillaux's *Mémoires*, I, 295-296, it was restated in 1932 by Clemenceau's erstwhile collaborator with *L'Aurore*, Urbain Gohier, in his *La Vraie Figure de Clemenceau* (Paris, 1932), 38-41.

CHAPTER FIVE

[1]*R* (1893), II, 141.

[2]*Ibid.*, 485-487.

[3]"Chambre des Députés," *Le Temps*, February 8, 1893, 3.
[3a]Bouvier, 188.
[4]*RG* (1898), II, 127.

[5]*Ibid.*, 118-119; *RG* (1893), 132.

[6]Chapman, 319-320; "Le Procès en Corruption," *Le Figaro*, March 11, 1893, 1; "Le Procès en Corruption," *ibid.*, March 12, 1893, 1-2.

[7]*RG* (1898), I, 64-65, 217.

[8]For reference, see footnote 159, Chapter III.

[9]Seignobos, 192.

[10]*RG* (1893), 121-122.

[11]*Ibid.*, 159-162.

[12]*RG* (1898), I, 324.

[13]*Ibid.*, II, 112.

[14]*Ibid.*, 101-103.

[15]*Ibid.*, 22.

[16]*R* (1893), II, 619-620. With regard to Franqueville's alleged covering up of the identity of "Marot" it should be observed that the nine Commission members who dissented from Vallé's report cited as one flagrant example of interference by the government in its activities the incident that occurred when a delegation from the Commission endeavoured to interrogate Chabert at the end of March, 1893:

> La Commission ayant été prévenue que M. Chabert était disposé à donner des explications qu'il avait tout d'abord éludées, decida de l'entendre à nouveau, et, comme il était malade, designa trois membres pour aller l'interroger.
>
> Cette Sous-Commission se présenta au domicile de M. Chabert le lendemain même, mais elle avait été dévancée par le juge d'instruction [Franqueville] qui l'avait interrogé deux heures auparavant, et lorsqu'elle demanda à M. Chabert de s'expliquer [one of the questions posed was the real name of "Marot"], celui-ci se tînt dans une réserve inattendue, disant que sa situation venait de changer, qu'il se croyait tenu par l'instruction Herz et que ses réponses dépendraient de ce que lui demanderait le juge d'instruction. *RG* (1893), 160.

[17]"A travers Paris," April 1, 1893, 1.

[18]"M. de Morès et M. Franqueville," April 6, 1893, 4.

[19]*JOC*, June 20, 1893, 1764-1767.

[20]*Ibid.*, 1767-1769.

[21]"Les Documents Norton," *Le Temps*, June 21, 1893, 2.

[22]"A travers Paris," *Le Figaro*, June 21, 1893, 1.

[23]In 1871, while Mayor of Montmartre, Clemenceau had advocated that France abandon Corsica to Italy on the ground that geographically the territory belonged in the Italian domain.

[24]The Premier and Foreign Minister never denied the truth of Mores' and Millevoye's allegations, although they were challenged to do so from a number of quarters. The French *chargé d'affaires* in London was embarrassed at having to justify his government's receiving Morès and Millevoye with their forged documents. *Documents diplomatiques français (1871-1914). 1re Série (1871-1900)*, X (Paris, 1919), 398-399.

[25]*JOC*, June 23, 1893, 1787-1794; Barrès, 209-210.

[26]Prologue to trial testimony. "L'Affaire Ducret-Norton," *Le Temps*, August 6, 1893, 4.

[27]Testimony of Calmette. *Ibid.*

[28]"Pour Norton," *La Justice*, July 2, 1893, 1.

[29]July 23, 1893, 1.

CHAPTER SIX

[1]Malartic, 114-115; Jean Masse, "Le mouvement anarchiste dans le département du Var de 1879 à 1904," *Actes du quatre-vingt-dixième Congrès national des Sociétés savantes. Section d'histoire moderne et contemporaine. Nice, 1965* (Paris, 1966), 430-432. Malartic has been used as a basic guide in the composition of this chapter.

[2]This has been suggested by Francisque Varenne, "Clemenceau devant ses électeurs du Var," *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*, CXCVIII (April-June 1949), 22.

[3]Malartic, 116-118.

[4]*Ibid.*, 117-120.

[5]These electoral systems were used at various times during the Third Republic. *Scrutin d'arrondissement* meant that each electoral district sent one deputy of its own to the Chamber; in *scrutin de liste* voting was done on a departmental basis, and the deputies sent

to the Chamber were those who headed a general plebiscite.

[6]Varenne, 23-24.

[7]Judet, 219, 226-228.

[8]*Ibid.*, 228.

[9]Léon Daudet, *La vie orageuse de Clemenceau*, 72.

[10]Malartic, 129n.

[11]For example, Pierre Dominique, *Clemenceau* (Paris, 1963), 111; Jackson, 81.

[12]*Ibid.*, 80-83.

[13]The text of the speech at Salernes was originally published under the title "Discours de M. Clemenceau" in *La Justice* on August 10, 1893. It was subsequently sold in booklet form. It is reproduced *in extenso* in Suarez, 244-271.

[14]"Les Elections Législatives," *Le Figaro*, August 14, 1893, 3.

[15]"L'Election du Var," *ibid.*, August 20, 1893, 1-2.

[16]"Morès," *La Justice*, August 13, 1893, 1.

[17]Malartic, 129-130.

[18]"A travers Paris," *Le Figaro*, August 13, 1893, 1.

[19]Morès had shouted at Clemenceau in the course of being interrogated at the Norton-Ducret trial on August 6, "Nous vous retrouverons dans le Var!" "L'Affaire Ducret-Norton," *Le Temps*, August 7, 1893, 3.

[20]"L'Election du Var," *Le Figaro*, August 19, 1893, 2.

[21]"Appel de M. Clemenceau aux électeurs," *La Justice*, August 17, 1893, 1.

[22]"L'Election du Var," *Le Figaro*, August 18, 1893, 2.

[23]Malartic, 127.

[24]"Démasqué," *La Justice*, August 11, 1893, 1; "Judet-la-Crapule," *ibid.*, August 16, 1893, 1.

[25]Judet, 220, 225.

[26]"Les litanies de M. Clémenceau," *Le Petit Journal*, August 19, 1893. Cited in *ibid.*, 223-225.

[27]"Revue de la Presse," *La Justice*, August 12, 1893, 1-2; "Tous contre un," *ibid.*, August 18, 1893, 1.

[28]"Revue des Journaux," *Le Figaro*, August 31, 1893, 2.

[29]"L'Élection du Var," *ibid.*, 1893, 2.

[30]Statement from one of Clemenceau's campaign posters. Cited in "Chronique électorale," *Le Temps*, September 1, 1893, 2.

[31]"Courrier du Var," *La Justice*, August 21, 1893, 1.

[32]Malartic, 134.

[33]Cited in "Les Socialistes et M. Clemenceau," *La Justice*, December 1, 1893, 1.

[34]Cited in "Revue des Journaux," *Le Figaro*, August 31, 1893, 2.

[35]"Les Ouvriers de Carmaux à Clemenceau," *La Justice*, September 1, 1893, 1.

[36]"Chambre des Députés," *Le Temps*, July 27, 1894, 2.

[37]H.M. Hyndman, Letter to the editor, *The Times* (London), September 14, 1897, 9.

[38]Cited in "Chronique électorale," *Le Temps*, September 6, 1893, 2. In view of the characterization of the tactics used against Clemenceau by *La Justice* as mercenary and denying the privilege of public speech, it seems strange that Clemenceau did not officially protest the result of the election. Numerous protests of similar conduct on the part of political opponents were lodged (admittedly, usually in vain) in the other *arrondissements*. See *JOC*, November 17, 1893, 6 ff.

CHAPTER SEVEN

[1]Gohier, *La Vraie Figure de Clemenceau*, 25.

[2]Suarez, 275-276.

[3]Maurice Barrès, *Ce que j'ai vu au temps du Panama* (Paris, 1906).

[4]Henry de Golen, *Le Président Doumer accuse . . .* (Paris, 1932), 150.

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